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DECEPTION, DEGENERATION, AND THE
DELEGATION OF DUTY: CONTRACTING
SAFETY OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN THE NCAA,
MEMBER INSTITUTIONS, AND STUDENTATHLETES
I. INTRODUCTION
“At the end of the day it’s football, you only got so many
opportunities, so I’m not going to let a little throw up[]
keep me out of the game, you know, ‘cause the game’s
on the line, everybody—I think . . . a lot of my
teammates—they would’ve done the same thing.”—
Jordan Matthews1
Jordan Matthews vomits immediately after slamming his head
against the turf in the 2013 season opener against Ole Miss.2 The
announcers praise advances in concussion protocol and Jordan’s
performance that night, convinced he would not be returning.3
However, Vanderbilt could not afford to have their best player benched
with three minutes to go in the fourth quarter and just a four-point
deficit.4 The game was on the line and Jordan’s team needed him.5
Remarkably, despite never undergoing concussion testing, Matthews
reenters just moments later.6 According to Vanderbilt, aside from the
VUCommodores, Townsend, Matthews & Woestmann - Austin Peay Week (Sept. 2, 2013),
YOUTUBE (Sept. 2, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2HBuIBlVTS0&feature
=youtu.be, archived at https://perma.cc/QUB2-KFVE.
2
See SEC Football Games, Vanderbilt vs Ole Miss 2013 FULL GAME HD (Sept. 2, 2013),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YylkXvMfr_o, archived at https://perma.cc/3ANHJT34 (showing the ESPN televised broadcast of the Ole Miss Rebels facing the Vanderbilt
Commordes at home on Aug. 29, 2013).
3
Id.
4
See Jason Kirk, Vanderbilt’s Jordan Matthews Vomits on the Field, Then Makes This Clutch
Catch, SB NATION (Aug. 30, 2013), http://www.sbnation.com/college-football/
2013/8/30/4674808/jordan-matthews-catch, archived at http://perma.cc/MWY-8MCN
(referring to Jordan Matthews as the Commodores’ best player); SEC Football Games, supra
note 2 (showing Vanderbilt down 32–28 with 3:12 left when the injury occurred).
5
See VUCommodores, supra note 1 (providing video of Matthews’ “heroics” in the
defining moments of the game); Jeff Lockridge & Nick Cole, Vanderbilt Receiver Explains
Why He Got Sick on Field, USA TODAY (Aug. 30, 2013, 10:18 AM), http://www.usatoday.
com/story/sports/ncaaf/sec/2013/08/30/jordan-matthews-vomit-vanderbilt-cramps/273
7197/, archived at http://perma.cc/6NEQ-TZ7Y (quoting Matthews saying, “[i]t was tough,
but I knew I couldn’t come out because my team needed me”).
6
Sam Mellinger, Death of Derek Sheely Shows Football’s Concussion Problems Extend Beyond
NFL, KANSAS CITY STAR (Aug. 31, 2013, 11:41 PM), available at http://www.kansas
city.com/news/local/article326476/Death-of-Derek-Sheely-shows-football%E2%80%99s1
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concussion inducing hit and subsequent illness, he exhibited no
concussion symptoms.7 Thus, it was impetuously determined that
mandatory concussion testing was unnecessary and Jordan Matthews
was cleared to play.8 Through its inaction, Vanderbilt decidedly
evidenced its priorities.9
Matthews felt compelled to return to the game, uninterested in
determining what induced his sudden illness.10 Likewise, Vanderbilt
coach James Franklin vehemently contended that he would never put his
player’s health in jeopardy, yet conceded that Matthews was crucial to
Vanderbilt’s success.11 Finally, Jordan Matthews’ last line of defense, the
medical staff, neglected to perform any precautionary tests even though
he undeniably displayed concussion symptoms.12 It is this very
concussion-problems-extend-beyond-NFL.html, archived at http://perma.cc/9S9W-A9K3;
Barry Petchesky, Jordan Matthews Hit His Head, Vomited, and Stayed in the Game, DEADSPIN
(Aug. 30, 2013, 8:49 AM), http://deadspin.com/jordan-matthews-hit-his-head-vomitedand-stayed-in-th-1226545337, archived at http://perma.cc/8KEE-T9D6; see also SEC Football
Games, supra note 2 (displaying Matthews returning after only one play, which baffles the
announcers).
7
See Associated Press, Jordan Matthews: No Concussion, ESPN (Sept. 3, 2013, 5:29 PM),
http://espn.go.com/college-football/story/_/id/9631350/vanderbilt-receiver-jordanmatthews-says-concussion, archived at http://perma.cc/4EP-DQ9Z [hereinafter Jordan
Matthews: No Concussion] (reiterating that Matthews stated the medical staff “knew that
there were no concussions symptoms”).
8
See Chase Goodbread, James Franklin Defends Handling of Jordan Matthews’ Health, NFL
(Sept. 3, 2013, 12:46 PM), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap1000000237703/article/
james-franklin-defends-handling-of-jordan-matthews-health, archived at http://perma.cc/
VK7T-M3LE (quoting former Vanderbilt coach, James Franklin, in his insistence that Jordan
Matthews was properly cleared to play); VUCommodores, supra note 1 (showing Jordan
Matthews contending that he definitely did not have a concussion); cf. Timothy Bella,
Explore: College Football Concussion Map, ALJAZEERA AM. (Dec. 27, 2013), http://america.
aljazeera.com/watch/shows/america-tonight/america-tonight-blog/2013/9/3/americatonight-s201314collegefootballconcussiondatabase.html, archived at http://perma.cc/
Q3HU-B4YL (illustrating that Vanderbilt did not report a single concussion as of December
27, 2013). In the 2013 season, only 192 concussions were reported among 10,000 players;
which, according to the NCAA’s Injury Surveillance Program, should be closer to 4,000
reported concussions per year. Timothy Bella, NCAA Head Games: The ‘Very Skewed’
Concussion Data in College Football, ALJAZEERA AM. (Jan. 9, 2014, 5:30 PM),
http://america.aljazeera.com/watch/shows/america-tonight/america-tonight-blog/2014
/1/9/ncaa-head-games-theveryskewedconcussiondataincollegefootball.html, archived at
http://perma.cc/C8G5-Y3F2. Interestingly, of those 192, not a single Vanderbilt player
was reported to have sustained a concussion. Id.
9
See, e.g., Petchesky, supra note 6 (criticizing Matthew’s lack of recovery time).
10
Teresa M. Walker, Vandy Receiver Insists He’s Fine After Hard Hit, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(Sep. 3, 2013, 4:32 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/vandy-receiver-insists-hes-fineafter-hard-hit, archived at http://perma.cc/32KK-FTBP.
11
Jordan Matthews: No Concussion, supra note 7.
12
Chris Huston, Vanderbilt’s Jordan Matthews Says He’s OK After Hit, NBC SPORTS (Sept.
3, 2013, 7:33 PM), http://collegefootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2013/09/03/vanderbiltsjordan-matthews-says-hes-ok-after-hit/, archived at http://perma.cc/L4UZ-PEV9; see also
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dichotomic situation that exemplifies the National Collegiate Athletic
Association’s (“NCAA”) flawed NCAA Concussion Policy and
Legislation (“Concussion Policy”).13
This Note analyzes the current NCAA Concussion Policy’s
ineffectiveness.14 It argues that the NCAA’s effort to relieve itself from
legal liability through its contractual relationship with universities that
are members of the NCAA (“member institutions”) is not only greatly
flawed, but seriously endangering the welfare of the student-athletes.15
To rectify this social wrong, the NCAA should redraft its Concussion
Policy to incentivize student-athletes to disclose concussion symptoms,
employ independent medical personnel to be present at every NCAA
sanctioned football game, and establish an oversight body to ensure
enforcement of the proposed policy.16
First, Part II illustrates the NCAA’s pervasive failure with historical,
legal, medical, and social background of the intercollegiate concussion
controversy.17 Next, Part III assesses the inadequacy of the current
NCAA Concussion Policy, specifically examining the NCAA’s failed
performance of its promise to protect student-athletes as third-party
beneficiaries of the NCAA and member institution’s contract.18 Last,
Part IV proposes redrafting the current NCAA Concussion Policy,
requiring independent medical personnel to be present at each game,
and establishing an outside monitoring system to ensure proper
Unquestionably, the NCAA’s unenforced and
implementation.19
ineffective Concussion Policy must be restructured to alleviate the
medical, social, and legal implications currently plaguing college
football, leaving nearly seventy thousand athletes defenseless.20
SEC Football Games, supra note 2 (providing the announcers’ reaction to Matthews’ injury
with stating that anyone on a medical staff knows vomiting is the first indication of a
concussion).
13
See infra Part II (demonstrating the conflicting incentives in intercollegiate football that
impede success of the NCAA Concussion Policy).
14
See infra Part III (analyzing the NCAA’s current, ineffective concussion policy).
15
See infra Part II (establishing the contractual relationship, while illustrating its
troubling application).
16
See infra Part IV (suggesting an outside governing body, independent medical
personnel, and redrafting of the current language).
17
See infra Part II (providing background, which evidences the need for an improved
monitoring system).
18
See infra Part III (assessing the current system’s shortcomings).
19
See infra Part IV (concluding that the issues surrounding the current NCAA
Concussion Policy can only be resolved through third-party enforcement and redrafting of
the current plan).
20
ERIN IRICK, NAT'L COLL. ATHLETIC ASS'N, NCAA SPORTS SPONSORSHIP &
PARTICIPATION RATES REP.: 1981–1982–2011–2012, 72 (2012), available at http://www.ncaa
publications.com/productdownloads/PR2013.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/DRK2-
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II. BACKGROUND
“From the President of the United States to the humblest member of
a . . . college faculty there arises a general protest against this boy-killing,
man-mutilating, money-making, gladiatorial sport.”21 Death and injury
has plagued intercollegiate football since its creation, thus necessitating
continuous regulation of the sport.22 The NCAA was established as a
result of this exigency.23 Ironically, the Association has recently endured
extensive criticism for its inconsistent regulation and erroneous
protection of student-athletes.24 Just as was the case in the beginning,
societal recognition and presidential condemnation of gridiron violence
has since led the NCAA to reassess safety standards for athletes.25
However, the NCAA’s failure to enforce its concussion policy has left it
susceptible to further denunciation and legal liability.26

36AA; see Andy Staples, The Price of Head Injuries, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Oct. 24, 2013),
http://mmqb.si.com/2013/10/24/nfl-draft-concussions-jahvid-best/, archived
at http://perma.cc/TJ8A-SWNJ (cautioning the desire to hide a concussion so to not hinder
the probability of playing in the NFL).
21
Taming Football, in 10 THE WORLD TO-DAY 3 (Shalier Mathews, ed. 1906).
22
Rodney K. Smith, A Brief History of the National Collegiate Athletic Association’s Role in
Regulating Intercollegiate Athletics, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 9, 10–11 (2000).
23
JOSEPH N. CROWLEY, IN THE ARENA: THE NCAA'S FIRST CENTURY 1, 9 (2006).
24
See Nathan Fenno, Internal NCAA Emails Raise Questions About Concussion Policy,
WASH. TIMES (Jul. 20, 2013, 2:33 PM), http://www.washingtontimes.com/blog/screenplay/2013/jul/20/internal-ncaa-emails-raise-questions-about-concuss/, archived at
http://perma.cc/NCZ2-NUBL [hereinafter Emails Raise Questions] (discussing the way the
NCAA handles head injuries).
25
JACKSON LEWIS LLP, CONCUSSIONS IN ATHLETES: WHERE WE ARE AND WHAT TO DO
NOW? 3, 4 (Jan. 2010), available at www.naia.org/fls/27900/1NAIA/resources/trainers/
NAIA_ConcussionsinAthletesSpecialReport.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/ZZ9RWGVV; Emails Raise Questions, supra note 24; see John Breech, President Obama: I Wouldn’t
Let My Son Play Pro Football, CBS SPORTS (Jan. 19, 2014, 2:14 PM),
http://www.cbssports.com/nfl/eye-on-football/24414125/president-obama-i-wouldnt-let
-my-son-play-pro-football, archived at http://perma.cc/7LYW-5YHS (quoting President
Obama who states, “if I had a son, I’d have to think long and hard before I let him play
football”); see also Memorandum in Support of Motion for Class Certification at 10,
Arrington v. NCAA, No. 11-cv-06356 (N.D. Ill. July 19, 2013), available at
http://sports.cbsimg.net/images/blogs/ncaa-concussions-2013-memo.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/PPC2-9TSW [hereinafter Arrington Memo] (providing the NCAA’s
acknowledgement of concussion management at the various other levels); THE LYSTEDT
LAW: A CONCUSSION SURVIVOR’S JOURNEY, CTR. DISEASE CONTROL (Mar. 12, 2010),
http://www.cdc.gov/media/subtopic/matte/pdf/031210-Zack-story.pdf,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/J7SS-9VCP (demonstrating that youth football has also employed
guidelines for safer play); Gary Mihoces, NFL Launches New Guidelines for Assessing
Concussions, USA TODAY (Mar. 30, 2011), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/
football/nfl/2011-03-29-concussions-protocol_N.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/M3Z9GYZH (outlining changes the NFL has implemented).
26
Emails Raise Questions, supra note 24.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol49/iss3/16

Johnson: Deception, Degeneration, and the Delegation of Duty: Contracting

2015] Deception, Degeneration, and the Delegation of Duty 1049
This Part explores the NCAA’s largely criticized concussion
management protocol by contextualizing the history and governance
structure of the NCAA, the nuances of a head injury, as well as the social
complexities involved in intercollegiate football.27 Part II.A provides
background on the NCAA and its governance structure, which has given
rise to legal liability, as well as explores the history of the NCAA’s
current concussion legislation.28 Part II.B discusses the epidemiology of
a concussion, which further evidences the current Concussion Policy’s
impracticalities.29 Finally, Part II.C presents the conflicting socioecological concerns that hinder concussion reporting.30
A. Two Curable Evils in American Life: Lynchings and Football
At the turn of the century, the American public sought to accomplish
the now unimaginable—outlaw and abolish football.31 In fact, the New
York Times published an editorial that strongly advocated for this
movement by associating college football with lynching.32 The campaign
to eliminate the sport arose after eighteen college athletes died in just one
season.33 As a result, the NCAA was formed to mitigate the increased
danger and nullify the subsequent crusade to eradicate football.34 It is
argued, however, that the Association has since disassociated from its
Next, Part II.A.1 establishes the NCAA’s
founding principal.35
27
See infra Part II (providing the history of concussions in the NCAA and the dangers
posed to student-athletes).
28
See infra Part II.A (examining the NCAA’s establishment and transformation).
29
See infra Part II.B (detailing the physiology of a concussion).
30
See infra Part II.C (establishing the contradicting motives of coaches, student-athletes,
and medical personnel).
31
Bob Greene, The President Who Saved Football, CNN (Feb. 5, 2012, 8:25 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2012/02/05/opinion/greene-super-bowl/, archived at
http://perma.cc/QA5G-G9NX.
32
John J. Miller, How Teddy Roosevelt Saved Football, N.Y. POST (Apr. 17, 2011, 4:00 AM),
available at http://nypost.com/2011/04/17/how-teddy-roosevelt-saved-football/, archived
at http://perma.cc/V26M-JZC2 (quoting the 1903 N.Y. Times headline regarding the “two
curable evils”). “The New York Times fussed over football’s trend toward ‘mayhem and
homicide’ . . . [t]he first evil it addressed was the lynching of blacks[, t]he second was
football.” Id.
33
CROWLEY, supra note 23, at 9; Smith, supra note 22. In addition to the deaths, 149
serious injuries arose out of the 1905 season alone. CROWLEY, supra.
34
CROWLEY, supra note 23, at 1; see also Mary Grace Miller, Comment, The NCAA and the
Student-Athlete: Reform is on the Horizon, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 1141, 1141–42 (2012)
(elaborating on the early years of the NCAA and the reasons for its formation); St. Nicholas
Stars, Notable Educators Meet to Discuss the Uplifting of College Athletics, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 3,
1909), available at http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=FB0813FC3E5D
12738DDDAA0894D9405B898CF1D3, archived at http://perma.cc/YDS8-D4RJ (conferring
the original intent for the NCAA).
35
See, e.g., Miller, supra note 34, at 1141–42 (illustrating the NCAA’s focal shift from
safety to amateurism).
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precarious governance scheme and the legal relationships that arise from
the Association’s legislation.36 Then, Part II.A.2 examines the NCAA’s
reliance on its governance structure to perpetuate its longstanding
disregard for player safety, as well as discusses the current legal battles
plaguing the NCAA.37
1.

The 12th Man

The NCAA is a “membership-driven organization dedicated to
safeguarding the well-being of student-athletes and equipping them
with the skills to succeed on the playing field, in the classroom and
throughout life.”38 It is comprised of over 1000 member institutions with
more than 400,000 athletes competing in three separate divisions.39 The
Association regulates intercollegiate athletics by enacting, supervising,
and enforcing legislation contained in its Constitution and bylaws.40
Each division’s NCAA Division Manual outlines the Association’s
legislation and operates as a legal contract between the NCAA and
member institutions.41 Compliance with NCAA legislation is regulated
by a self-reporting system, which entrusts member institutions with
exposing their own infractions to the Association by fully disclosing all
information requested by the NCAA’s formal investigating staff.42

36
See infra Part II.A.1 (providing the interworking of the NCAA governance structure
and legal implications).
37
See infra Part II.A.2 (elaborating on the NCAA Concussion Policy’s defectiveness and
subsequent lawsuits).
38
About the NCAA, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about (last visited Mar. 15, 2015),
archived at http://perma.cc/5L89-PH2K.
39
NCAA MEMBERSHIP REPORT: 2008–09, NCAA, 5 (2009); see also NCAA College Athletics
Statistics, STATISTIC BRAIN (Apr. 26, 2014), http://www.statisticbrain.com/ncaa-collegeathletics-statistics/, archived at http://perma.cc/9W4U-E776 (calculating a total of 420,000
NCAA student-athletes as of May 8, 2012).
40
NCAA ACADEMIC AND MEMBERSHIP AFFAIRS STAFF, 2014–2015 NCAA DIV. I MANUAL
viii, art. 1.2 (Jan. 2015), available at http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/
D115JAN.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/SAN9-E9DE [hereinafter DIVISION I MANUAL].
41
Connor J. Bush, The Legal Shift of the NCAA’s “Big 5” Member Conferences to Independent
Athletic Associations: Combining NFL and Conference Governance Principles to Maintain the
Unique Product of College Athletics, 16 U. DENV. SPORTS & ENT. L. J. 5, 11 (2014); see Knelman
v. Middlebury Coll., 898 F. Supp. 2d 697, 715 (D. Vt. 2012) (referring to the relationship
between the NCAA and member institutions as contractual in nature); Oliver v. NCAA,
920 N.E.2d 203, 211 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 2008) (specifying that a contract unquestionably
exists between the NCAA and member institutions).
42
CROWLEY, supra note 23, at 83. However, the Association has safeguarded this system
by also enacting a formal process responsible for formal investigations of rule violations.
Maureen A. Weston, NCAA Sanctions: Assigning Blame Where It Belongs, 52 B.C. L. Rev. 551,
563 (2011).
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In fact, everyone within an institution’s athletic program is
contractually obligated to expose potential violations.43 In addition to
requirements under the Division I Manual, failure to report infractions is
also a violation of the NCAA’s Certification of Compliance for Staff
Members of Athletic Departments form and can subject an institution to
fines, loss of scholarships, or in extreme cases, removal from the
NCAA.44 Student-athletes also benefit from this contractual relationship
between the NCAA and member institutions.45
The NCAA and member institution’s contractual relationship
extends to student-athletes under several legal theories.46 As third-party
beneficiaries, student-athletes may enforce assurances made under the
Constitution and bylaws.47 Although courts have determined a third-

NCAA, Certification of Compliance for Staff Members of Athletic Dept’s 1 (2014), available at
http://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/DI%20Form%2014-2%20-%20Certification%20
of%20Compliance%20for%20Staff%20Members%20of%20Athletics%20Departments.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/AN4Y-HXCN.
44
Rodney K. Smith, Increasing Presidential Accountability in Big-Time Intercollegiate
Athletics, 10 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 297, 316 (2003); DUQ. U., Investigating and Reporting
NCAA Violations 1, available at http://grfx.cstv.com/photos/schools/duqu/genrel/
auto_pdf/violations.pdf (last visited Sept. 6, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/4CBB-X9UJ
[hereinafter Investigating and Reporting NCAA Violations].
45
See Oliver, 920 N.E.2d at 200 (noting the contract between the NCAA and member
instructions in discussing student-athletes third-party beneficiary status); Joel Eckert,
Student-Athlete Contract Rights in the Aftermath of Bloom v. NCAA, 59 VAND. L. REV. 905, 910
(2006) (stating that Bloom “marked the first time that a court acknowledged unequivocally
that student-athletes have contract rights under the NCAA Constitution and bylaws”).
46
See Bloom v. NCAA, 93 P.3d 621, 624 (Colo. App. 2004) (finding third-party
beneficiary status); Hall v. NCAA, 985 F. Supp. 782, 796 (1997) (identifying a promissory
estoppel claim); Arrington v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 11-cv-06356, at 74–94 (N.D. Ill.
Feb. 12, 2013) [hereinafter Second Amended Class Action Complaint] (alleging several
contract claims).
47
See Fellheimer v. Middlebury Coll., 869 F. Supp. 238, 242 (D. Vt. 1994) (finding that a
college has an obligation to act in a manner consistent with the terms of the Handbook).
Moreover, additional documents may be incorporated if specifically referenced in the
contract. See Knelman v. Middlebury Coll., 570 F. App'x 66, 68 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing
Newton v. Smith Motors, Inc., 175 A.2d 514, 516 (1961)) (“‘[A] contract may be reached
with reference to another writing, and the other document, or so much of it as is referred
to, will be interpreted as a part of the main instrument,’ but ‘the extrinsic writing must be
connected by specific reference or by such mutual knowledge and understanding.’”). See
generally Leslie E. Wong, Comment, Our Blood, Our Sweat, Their Profit: Ed O'Bannon Takes
on the NCAA for Infringing on the Former Student-Athlete's Right of Publicity, 42 TEX. TECH L.
REV. 1069, 1074 (2010) (defining a third-party beneficiary). The athlete’s right to enforce
any promise is contingent upon the original contracting parties’ intent. See generally
Hairston v. Pac. 10 Conference, 101 F.3d 1315, 1320 (9th Cir. 1996) (articulating intent
analysis). An individual attempting to show status as a third-party beneficiary cannot
simply illustrate that he will benefit from performance of the contract, but must specifically
demonstrate that the contracting parties intended to bestow a benefit upon him. McCarthy
v. Azure, 22 F.3d 351, 362 (1st Cir. 1994).
43
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party beneficiary status arises under the NCAA legislation, the finding
has been confined to claims arising out of enforcement of eligibility
requirements.48 This conclusion is based upon the notion that “member
institutions agree to let the NCAA set the criteria and to abide by the
NCAA’s final eligibility decision.”49 In turn, the student-athlete stands
to directly benefit from the contract’s performance; therefore, he acquires
rights under the agreement, as well as the ability to enforce the contract’s
promises once the rights have vested.50
Student-athletes, as third-party beneficiaries, may also bring a claim
of good faith and fair dealing.51 The covenant of good faith is an
“implied-in-law promise not to do anything to undermine or destroy
[the
plaintiff’s]
rights
to
receive
the
benefit
of
the
parties’ . . . agreement.”52 Negligence or refusal to fulfill a contractual
obligation rises to the level of bad faith if it is prompted by an interested
or sinister motive.53
Under 2014–2015 NCAA Division I Manual (“Division I Manual”),
the NCAA articulates a commitment to the well-being of studentathletes.54
The Association effectuates this promise through
“uphold[ing] the principle of institutional control of, and responsibility
for, all intercollegiate sports in conformity with the constitution and

48
Knelman, 898 F. Supp. 2d at 715. See generally Hall, 985 F. Supp. at 797 (exemplifying a
successful third-party beneficiary claim against the NCAA).
49
Knelman, 898 F. Supp. 2d at 715 (citing Oliver v. NCAA, 920 N.E.2d at 200).
50
Id. In considering whether terms gives rise to an intentional benefit, courts employ an
objective analysis of the contract language, as well as evaluate extrinsic evidence
interpreting that language, and all surrounding circumstances. Huff v. FirstEnergy Corp.,
957 N.E.2d 3, 9 (2011). Put differently, courts consider whether “circumstances indicate
that the promisee intend[ed] to give the beneficiary the benefit of the promised
performance.” Knelman, 898 F. Supp. 2d at 714. Once intent is established and the studentathlete’s rights have vested, the NCAA and member institutions are bound to perform their
contractual obligations. Oliver, 920 N.E.2d at 200. See generally Olson v. Etheridge, 686
N.E.2d 563, 570 (1997) (explaining that vesting occurs if the beneficiary knows of and has
detrimentally relied on the rights, has expressly assented to the contract at the request of
one of the parties, or if the beneficiary files a lawsuit to enforce the contract).
51
See Knelman, 898 F. Supp. 2d at 716 (elaborating on the duty of good faith).
52
Id. (citations omitted).
53
Id. at 714.
54
DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 40, at 348. Under Article 20.9.1.6 of the Division I
Manual, the NCAA asserts its commitment to student-athlete well-being. Id. The
Association directs: “Intercollegiate athletics programs shall be conducted in a manner
designed to enhance the well-being of student-athletes who choose to participate . . . . Each
member institution should also provide an environment that fosters fairness,
sportsmanship, safety, honesty and positive relationships between student-athletes and
representatives of the institution.” Id. (emphasis added). For purposes of efficiency, this
Note will concentrate on legislation contained in the Division I Manual.
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bylaws of th[e] Association.”55 The NCAA further delineates that
“student-athletes rightfully assume that those who sponsor
intercollegiate athletics have taken reasonable precautions to minimize
the risks of injury from athletics participation.”56 To effectuate its role in
minimizing the risk of injuries, the NCAA ensures member institutions
implement and enforce the Association’s legislation and subject
noncompliant members to the infractions process.57 In regard to
compliance with the NCAA’s Concussion Protocol, the NCAA
articulates, “[a] violation of [the protocol] shall be considered an
institutional violation per Constitution 2.8.1.”58 However, prior to 2010,
legislation specific to concussions was omitted from the NCAA’s
Division I Manual.59

DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 40, at art. 1.2(b); see id. at art. 1.3.2 (“Member
institutions shall be obligated to apply and enforce this legislation, and the infractions
process of the Association shall be applied to an institution when it fails to fulfill this
obligation.”); id. at art. 2.8.2 (“The Association shall assist the institution in its efforts to
achieve full compliance with all rules and regulations and shall afford the institution, its
staff and student-athletes fair procedures in the consideration of an identified or alleged
failure in compliance.”); id. at art. 2.8.3 (“An institution found to have violated the
Association’s rules shall be subject to such disciplinary and corrective actions as may be
determined by the Association.”). The NCAA revised Article 1.3.2 on July 31, 2014, which
previously read: “Member institutions shall be obligated to apply and enforce this
legislation, and the enforcement procedures of the Association shall be applied to an institution
when it fails to fulfill this obligation.” Compare DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 40, at art.
1.3.2, with NCAA ACADEMIC AND MEMBERSHIP AFFAIRS STAFF, 2013–2014 NCAA DIVISION I
MANUAL art. 1.3.2 (July 2013) (on file with author) (emphasis added). See generally Gene
Marsh & Marie Robbins, Weighing the Interests of the Institution, the Membership and
Institutional Representatives in an NCAA Investigation, 55 FLA. L. REV. 667, 668–69 (2003)
(discussing the toll an institutional violation has on football programs).
56
DAVID KLOSSNER, 2013–14 NCAA SPORTS MEDICINE HANDBOOK 2, 63 (Aug. 2013),
available at http://www.ncaapublications.com/DownloadPublication.aspx?download=
MD13.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/7YS-QQJE [hereinafter MEDICINE HANDBOOK].
Ultimately, the NCAA contends that everyone involved in intercollegiate athletics shares
responsibility to reduce the risk of injury during competition. Id. The Association collects
data and contributes recommendations to modify safety guidelines or rules of play to
ensure safety. Id.
57
See DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 40, at art. 1.2(b) (“The purposes of this Association
are . . . [t]o uphold the principle of institutional control of, and responsibility for, all
intercollegiate sports in conformity with the constitution and bylaws of this Association.”).
58
MEDICINE HANDBOOK, supra note 56, at 63; see also infra note 67 and accompanying text
(establishing shall as a mandatory, rather than directory, term).
59
See DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 40, at 11 (indicating that it was enacted in 2010); see
also JACKSON LEWIS LLP, supra note 25 (providing that “[f]or years, the NCAA’s guidance in
the area of concussion management has been a few pages in the NCAA Sports Medicine
Handbook”).
55
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The Castro of College Athletics

The NCAA is currently experiencing the most threatening coup
d'état of its 100-year reign.60 Its constituents are tirelessly attempting to
overthrow its amateurism ideology, while seeking greater autonomy.61
In doing so, the most prominent governing body in all of sports has been
publically disgraced as a self-serving dictatorship.62 Ironically, the
governmental body responsible for protecting player health and safety is
now associated with a form of leadership notorious for its brutality.63
Accordingly, players have initiated lawsuits as a result of the NCAA’s
continued failure to secure their safety.64 Unfortunately, the NCAA has
demonstrated a history of disingenuous efforts to create an illusion of
protection, while attempting to negate its longstanding disregard for an
athlete’s overall well-being.65

60
See Stephen F. Ross et al., Judicial Review of NCAA Eligibility Decisions: Evaluation of the
Restitution Rule and a Call for Arbitration, 40 J.C. & U.L. 79, 96–97 (2014) (evaluating the
impracticability of the NCAA’s restitution rule in regards to student-athlete’s eligibility);
Peter Torncello & Gregg E. Clifton, Concussion Injuries Controversy Not Restricted to
Professional Athletics, C. & PROF. SPORTS L. BLOG (Jan. 15, 2014), http://www.collegeand
prosportslaw.com/amateur-sports/concussion-injuries-controversy-not-restricted-toprofessional-athletics/, archived at http://perma.cc/RL2Q-PWAA (noting that the NCAA
is involved in numerous lawsuits due to its alleged negligence).
61
See Dave Jamieson & Emily Swanson, Public Backs College Football Players’ Grievances,
POST
(Feb.
15,
2014,
8:42
AM),
But
Not
Their
Union,
HUFF.
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/02/15/college-football-players-union_n_4790136.
html?&ncid=tweetlnkushpmg00000067,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/7FXZ-N4CS
(contextualizing Northwestern’s attempt to form a union to bargain for medical coverage
and scholarship terms).
62
Dave Zirin, ‘Right Now the NCAA is Like a Dictatorship’: Why the Northwestern Football
Team Formed a Union, NATION (Jan. 28, 2014, 11:07 PM), http://www.thenation.com/
blog/178142/right-now-ncaa-dictatorship-why-northwestern-football-team-formed-union,
archived at http://perma.cc/KAA2-KUJC.
63
WALTER T. CHAMPION, JR., FUNDAMENTALS OF SPORTS LAW 339 (2d ed. 2004). See
generally Susana Narotzky, The Project in the Model: Reciprocity, Social Capital, and the Politics
of Ethnographic Realism, 48 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 403, 407 (2007) (conveying the
suppression of rights that stem from a dictatorial government); see c.f. Milan W. Svolik,
Power Sharing and Leadership Dynamics in Authoritarian Regimes, 53 AM. J. POL. SCI. 477, 477
(2009) (identifying Fidel Castro as the former dictator Cuba, retiring after fifty years in
power).
64
See Teddy Greenstein, Kain Colter: Man Meets Moment, CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 15, 2014),
available at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2014-02-15/sports/ct-kain-colter-collegeunion-spt-0216-20140216_1_kain-colter-northwestern-capa, archived at http://perma.cc/
D8AL-B7VF (delineating the lawsuit filed against the NCAA for neglecting to ensure
player safety).
65
See infra Part II.A.2 (exploring the history of NCAA concussion management).
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On August 12, 2010, the Association enacted the NCAA Concussion
The Concussion Plan
Management Plan (“Concussion Plan”).66
mandates that “[a]n active member institution shall have a Concussion
Additionally, each
Management Plan for its student-athletes.”67
institution is responsible for drafting a plan, implementing the plan, and
ensuring compliance on behalf of the entire institution.68
Noncompliance is considered an institutional violation and subject to

DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 40, at art. 3.2.4.17. NCAA Approach to Concussions:
Behind the Blue Disk, NCAA, https://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/ncaaapproach-concussions (last visited Sept. 7, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/67H3-E5AA.
67
DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 40, at 3.2.4.17; Kevin Vaughan, Did NCAA Ignore
Concussion Issue?, FOXSPORTS (June 6, 2014, 3:07 PM), http://msn.foxsports.com/
collegefootball/story/ncaa-concussion-lawsuit-mediation-harder-time-than-nfl-defendingitself-110413, archived at http://perma.cc/U5KP-DMY9 (delivering that enforcement was
still left discretion to the institutions). See generally Arrington Memo, supra note 25, at 42
(illustrating the NCAA’s discussion of whether shall or should would be used and the
implications it would have on the NCAA). The Director of Health and Safety ultimately
informed member institutions that “[a]ll of the shalls will be should’s.” Id. at 42, 50.
Generally, shall is mandatory and not directory. Village of Mundelein v. Hartnett, 454
N.E.2d 29, 33 (Ill. App. 2d 1983). The Plan further articulates that:
The plan shall include, but is not limited to, the following: (Adopted:
8/12/10)
(a) An annual process that ensures student-athletes are educated about
the signs and symptoms of concussions. Student-athletes must
acknowledge that they have received information about the signs and
symptoms of concussions and that they have a responsibility to report
concussion-related injuries and illnesses to a medical staff member;
(b) A process that ensures a student-athlete who exhibits signs,
symptoms or behaviors consistent with a concussion shall be removed
from athletics activities (e.g., competition, practice, conditioning
sessions) and evaluated by a medical staff member (e.g., sports
medicine staff, team physician) with experience in the evaluation and
management of concussions;
(c) A policy that precludes a student-athlete diagnosed with a
concussion from returning to athletics activity (e.g., competition,
practice, conditioning sessions) for at least the remainder of that
calendar day; and
(d) A policy that requires medical clearance for a student-athlete
diagnosed with a concussion to return to the athletics activity (e.g.,
competition, practice, conditioning sessions) as determined by a
physician (e.g., team physician) or the physician’s designee.
DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 40, at art. 3.2.4.17.
68
See DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 40, at art. 3.2.4.17 (demonstrating that all
obligations are on the member institution). See generally UNIV. OF MIAMI DEP’T OF
ATHLETICS CONCUSSION GUIDELINES, UNIV. MIAMI (Aug. 1, 2014), available at
http://hurricanesports.com/fls/28700/files/2014%20University%20of%20Miami%20CON
CUSSION%20POLICY.PDF, archived at http://perma.cc/6HQE-33B6 (exemplifying a
member institution’s concussion management plan).
66
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penalties imposed under the Constitution.69
However, member
institutions often afford football programs greater protection because of
their profitability; thus, universities will conceal violations that implicate
its football program.70 To date, a member institution has never been
charged with an infraction under the policy, despite blatant disregard.71
See MEDICINE HANDBOOK, supra note 56, at 2, 63 (enumerating the penalties for
noncompliance). “A violation of Constitution 3.2.4.17 shall be considered an institutional
violation per Constitution 2.8.1; however, the violation shall not affect the student-athlete’s
eligibility.” Id. Although the document itself evidences enforcement, the NCAA has never
actually effectuated any punishment. Emails Raise Questions, supra note 24; see also NCAA
DIV. I ADOPTED LEGIS. PROPOSAL NO. 2013-16, NCAA (Jan. 21, 2014), available at
http://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/adopted_proposals_0114.pdf,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/CB2W-WDDB (dictating that a violation of 3.2.4.17 is considered a
violation of failing to designate a team physician); DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 40, at 4
(establishing the responsibility of the institution). The manual states:
Each institution shall comply with all applicable rules and regulations
of the Association in the conduct of its intercollegiate athletics
programs. It shall monitor its programs to assure compliance and to
identify and report to the Association instances in which compliance
has not been achieved. In any such instance, the institution shall
cooperate fully with the Association and shall take appropriate
corrective actions. Members of an institution’s staff, student-athletes,
and other individuals and groups representing the institution’s
athletics interests shall comply with the applicable Association rules,
and the Member Institution shall be responsible for such compliance.
Id.
70
See, e.g., Marsh & Robbins, supra note 55, at 668–69 (stating that “[w]hat campus
leaders know is that although some people in another league or another part of the country
may view college football as only a game, for many people affiliated with the institution, it
is THE GAME”); see c.f. Stephanie Taylor Christensen, The Surprising Economics of College
Football, MINYANVILLE (Nov. 11, 2011, 2:10 PM), http://www.minyanville.com/
businessmarkets/articles/college-football-economics-penn-state-football/11/11/2011/id/
37880, archived at http://perma.cc/8DRM-W2MM, (demonstrating that “there's a lot of
money at stake in college football”); Alicia Jessup, The Economics of College Football: A Look
at the Top 25 Teams’ Revenues and Expenses, FORBES (Aug. 31, 2013, 10:32 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/aliciajessop/2013/08/31/the-economics-of-college-football
-a-look-at-the-top-25-teams-revenues-and-expenses/, archived at http://perma.cc/9AGHU7B7 (providing the Department of Education’s data illustrating that college football
programs often create the most revenue for an athletic department).
71
See Brad Wolverton, Coach Makes the Call: Athletic Trainers Who Butt Heads with Coaches
over Concussion Treatment Take Career Hits, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Sept. 2, 2013),
http://chronicle.com/article/Trainers-Butt-Heads-With/141333/,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/DT6Z-YH6N (analyzing the stricter guidelines). The NCAA added
language to its Handbook advising that “[u]nder no circumstances should a student-athlete
diagnosed with a concussion return to a sports activity the same day.” Id. However, the
NCAA’s Chief Medical Officer, Brian Hainline, contended that the NCAA “can say, [t]his is
how we believe medical care should be delivered . . . [but] can’t just shift and say, now
everyone's going to do this.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Nathan Fenno,
NCAA’s Concussion Culture Rooted in Denial, WASH. TIMES (July 22, 2013),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jul/22/ncaa-concussion-culture-rooted69
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Just one year after the 2010 amendments, Frostburg State fullback
Derek Sheely died from head trauma he sustained on the field after
being chastised by his coach to continue playing while concussed.72
Following his death, Derek’s mother wrote a letter to NCAA president,
Mark Emmert, requesting the NCAA’s support in her quest to prevent
catastrophic head injuries.73 The NCAA’s Director of Health and Safety,
Dr. David Klossner responded on behalf of Mr. Emmert, stating that
“[p]art of the NCAA’s core mission is to provide student-athletes with a

denial/?page=all, archived at http://perma.cc/ZRJ5-MRUB [hereinafter NCAA’s Concussion
Culture Rooted in Denial] (quoting the NCAA Director of Enforcement’s email to the NCAA
President asserting it would be inappropriate to punish a coach for violating the
concussion policy).
72
Matt Crossman, Sharing Derek Sheely: A Helmet-to-Helmet Hit Took the Life of a 22-YearOld Football Player: Two Years Later, Friends and Family Keep His Memory Alive, One Story at a
Time, SB NATION (Dec. 17, 2013) http://www.sbnation.com/longform/2013/12/17/
5217634/sharing-derek-sheely-a-helmet-to-helmet-hit-took-the-life-of-a-22,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/AZE3-VDDL. Derek Sheely was just twenty-two years old when he
sustained a blow to the head that cost him his life. Id. He endured two straight days of
rigorous contact before informing his coaches that he “didn’t feel right.” Id. Unfortunately,
his plea for help was met with demands to toughen up and “[g]et back out there.”
Complaint at 7–8, Kristen L. Sheely et al. v. NCAA, No. 380569-V (Montgomery Cnty. Ct.
Md. Aug. 22, 2013) [hereinafter Sheely Complaint] (noting that the word concussion was
not mentioned a single time in the Frostburg’s team policies). Derek died from the brain
injury he sustained during practice. Id.; see also Barry Patchesky, Why Did Derek Sheely Die?,
DEADSPIN (Nov. 13, 2013, 10:37 AM), http://deadspin.com/family-of-player-killed-inpractice-sues-ncaa-coaches-1188048031/1463651387, archived at http://perma.cc/F8XAZM6M (illustrating the pervasive failure). “[J]ust about every authority failed [him], and
neither the school nor the NCAA seem particularly keen on getting to the bottom of what
happened.” Id. According to an anonymous letter sent to the Sheely’s after Derek’s death,
the Frostburg coaches continued to yell at him even after he collapsed. Sara Ganim,
Unnecessary Roughness? Players Question NCAA’s Record on Concussions, CNN (Oct. 30, 2014,
9:00 AM), http://www.cnn.com/interactive/2014/10/us/ncaa-concussions/, archived at
http://perma.cc/THU6-U999. The complaint quotes:
We must distinguish between pain and injury . . . In the rare event you
are injured, remember the following: . . .
5. If one cannot practice on Wednesday, he CANNOT START ON
SATURDAY.
6. If one cannot practice on a Thursday, he probably will not
dress . . .
8. Great champions can distinguish between pain and injury.
Sheely Complaint, supra, at 13.
73
Letter from Kristen Sheely, Exec. Dir., The Derek Sheely Fund., to Mark Emmert,
President, NCAA (Dec. 30, 2011), available at http://nflconcussionlitigation.com/?p=1067,
archived at http://perma.cc/39S2-WBAM; Nathan Fenno, Death of Frostburg State Player
Derek Sheely Due to ‘Egregious Misconduct,’ Lawsuit Says, WASH. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2013),
available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/aug/22/death-frostburg-stateplayer-derek sheely-due-egre/#ixzz2iKGL1OeG, archived at http://perma.cc/AX6P-UXJW.
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competitive environment that is safe and ensures fair play.”74 He
assured her that the NCAA “will continue to devote [its] attention to
health and safety issues and . . . enact change to its rules and standards
when the medical evidence indicates it is appropriate to do so,” yet
refused to investigate Derek’s death.75 Ironically, Dr. Klossner’s evasive
response to Derek Sheely’s death directly contradicts his original intent
for the NCAA’s Concussion Policy.76
Initially, Dr. Klossner contended that the 2010 Concussion Plan
would harshly punish coaches who knowingly returned a concussed
athlete to play, but quickly retracted his statement and instead claimed
infractions only be imposed in cases of systematic disregard.77 Yet, the
NCAA admittedly did not have any oversight system in place to confirm
that a member institution was following the Concussion Policy, nor did
it enforce its requirement that each school have a concussion plan on
file.78 According to the NCAA’s Director of Enforcement, Chris Strobel,
“[t]he [concussion] legislation was specifically written to require
institutions to have a plan and describe what minimum components had
74
Letter from David Klossner, NCAA Dir. of Health and Safety, to Kristen Sheely, Exec.
Dir., The Derek Sheely Fund. (Mar. 20, 2012), available at http://nflconcussion
litigation.com/?p=1067, archived at http://perma.cc/39S2-WBAM.
75
Id.
76
See Sheely Complaint, supra note 72, at 24–27 (showing Dr. Klossner’s crusade to
implement strict rules). Dr. Klossner was deterred from his initial ambition by fellow
NCAA staff members’ fear of liability. Id. at 26. In an email thread, the Director of the
Playing Rules Administration states, “Dave [Klossner] is hot/heavy on the concussion
stuff. He's been trying to force our rules committees to put in rules that are not good–I
think I’ve finally convinced him to calm down.” Id.
77
Id. at 23–24. In particular, Strobel initially stated “[p]enalties will depend on the
circumstances of the violation . . . a coach [who] requires a student-athlete to compete after
being informed [he] has been diagnosed with a concussion, [] would require a significant
penalty.” Id. at 23. Yet, two hours later he claimed his emails were premature and was
corrected that only “systematic or blatant disregard for the plan that would indicate a lack
of institutional control” would most likely be considered a major violation. Id.; Nathan
Fenno, NCAA Continues to Prove it is Hypocritical to the Core, WASH. TIMES (Dec. 24, 2013),
available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/dec/24/fenno-ncaa-continuesprove-it-hypocritical-core/?page=all, archived at http://perma.cc/JJS2-MU3U [hereinafter
Hypocritical to the Core] (illustrating the NCAA’s evasiveness with regard to player safety).
“‘The NCAA denies that it has a legal duty to protect student-athletes,’ but admits that it
was ‘founded to protect young people from the dangerous and exploitative athletic
practices of the time.’” Id.
78
Hypocritical to the Core, supra note 77; see Eye On College Football Staff, Report: NCAA
Staffers Were Not on Board with Concussion Policy, CBS SPORTS (July 21, 2013, 12:59 PM),
http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/eye-on-college-football/22837768/reportncaa-staffers-were-not-on-board-with-concussion-policy, archived at http://perma.cc/
CJH2-B5PU (stating an internal NCAA survey indicated that half of the member
institutions “[did not] require a concussed athlete to see a doctor . . . [and o]nly sixty-six
percent of schools used baseline testing”).
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to be part of the plan—not about enforcing whether or not they were
Ultimately, however, increased societal
following their plan.”79
awareness of concussion dangers, unrelenting criticism of the NCAA,
and a class action lawsuit forced the Association to finally implement
additional procedures.80
On September 12, 2011, former Eastern Illinois team captain, Adrian
Arrington, filed a class action lawsuit against the NCAA for its
mismanagement of concussions.81 The Plaintiffs alleged negligence,
fraudulent concealment, medical monitoring, and unjust enrichment.82
Shortly thereafter, several other former NCAA athletes began filing
lawsuits against the NCAA for concussion mismanagement, which were
Emails Raise Questions, supra note 24.
See Complaint, Arrington v. NCAA, No. 11CV06356 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 12, 2011)
[hereinafter Arrington Complaint] (illustrating the motivation for the class action lawsuit);
Arrington Memo, supra note 25, at 33 (exposing internal NCAA emails addressing societal
pressure); Jon Solomon, Who’s Suing the NCAA? AL.com Database of Concussion Lawsuits by
Ex-Players, AL.COM (Feb. 6, 2014, 5:00 AM), http://www.al.com/sports/index.ssf/2014/
02/whos_suing_the_ncaa_alcom_data.html, archived at http://perma.cc/Z44K-HPX5
(conveying further information on the lawsuits failed against the NCAA). The NCAA
Managing Director of Government Relations, Abe Frank, cautioned his colleagues that
“[t]he landscape has clearly changed around us, at the professional and high school levels,
so the focus will remain on us as long as we do not have a rule that keeps a player out (at
least same day) after a hit to the head. It probably is not inconsistent to both have a base
line rule regarding return to play and still keep most of the decisions at the local institution
level.” Arrington Memo, supra. The Director of Health and Safety then asserted that he did
not understand why it was necessary by replying, “[a]nd if not, what is the fall out. I am
not sure I have a grasp of not having a rule versus recommendations that favor
institutional control.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Correspondingly, the
Associate Director of Government Relations replied:
I assume we will continue to get negative press and likely continued
Congressional scrutiny in the short run. I do not expect the issue to go
away soon as some baseline requirement . . . in this important area for
the health and safety of our student-athletes is likely seen as a
reasonable act to deter long term injury by many in the public.
Id. at 34.
81
Arrington Complaint, supra note 77; see Rachael Axon, Does NCAA Face More
Concussion Liability Than NFL?, USA TODAY (July 25, 2013, 8:36 PM), available at
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2013/07/25/ncaa-concussion-lawsuitadrian-arrington/2588189/, archived at http://perma.cc/6M6Z-JNCZ (narrating the story
of Adrian Arrington, former college athlete and named plaintiff in the current class action
suit against the NCAA who suffered a career-ending hit in 2009). See, e.g., Spencer
Anderson, NCAA INSTITUTIONS AND A DUTY TO WARN FOOTBALL STUDENT-ATHLETES: A
LOOK
INTO
THE
ARRINGTON
V.
NCAA
CASE
5–6,
available
at
http://nflconcussionlitigation.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/NCAA-Institutionsand-a-Duty-to-Warn-copy1.pdf,
(last
visited
Sept.
19,
2014),
archived
at
http://perma.cc/KUN5-L5JV (providing additional information on the lawsuit).
82
Greg Ryan, Ex-NCAA Players Take Page From NFL Concussion Suit, LAW360 (Feb. 15,
2013, 7:39 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/416040/ex-ncaa-players-take-pagefrom-nfl-concussion-suit, archived at http://perma.cc/YT9S-ZGBJ.
79
80
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then consolidated with the Arrington lawsuit.83 On February 12, 2013,
the Plaintiffs’ complaint was further amended to include express and
implied contract claims based upon several well-established contract
theories.84 During this time, both the NCAA and the student-athletes
mutually sought a stay of the court’s consideration in order to pursue
settlement discussions.85 The negotiations resulted in a proposed and
largely criticized $75 million settlement, which was ultimately rejected
by United States District Court Judge John Z. Lee.86
During the same month as the proposed settlement, the NCAA
released updated guidelines on concussion management similar to the
Under the
agreed upon conditions of the settlement.87
recommendations, the NCAA proposed limiting live contact during
practice, ensuring that players receive medical care from independent
experts whose sole interest is the athlete’s well-being, and that member
institutions make their concussion plans available to the public.88 As
part of the settlement agreement, the NCAA also implemented a
reporting process for member institutions to report diagnosed
concussions, which was eventually enacted as legislation in the Division
I Manual.89
On January 17, 2015, the NCAA updated its Division I Manual to
include an additional section on Concussion Safety Protocol.90 The new
protocol instituted a requirement that every institution annually submit
its concussion guidelines to the Concussion Safety Protocol Committee.91

83
In Re NCAA Student-Athlete Concussion Injury Litigation, No. 13 C 9116, at 3 (ND Ill.
Dec. 17, 2014) [hereinafter Settlement Decision].
84
Second Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 46, at 74–94.
85
Settlement Decision, supra note 83, at 3.
86
Ben Strauss, Judge Rejects $75 Million Settlement in Lawsuit Against N.C.A.A. on Head
Injuries, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2014), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/18/
sports/judge-rejects-75-million-settlement-in-lawsuit-against-ncaa-on-head-injuries.html?_
r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/W4LA-GAMX.
Among his concerns, Judge Lee
questioned the NCAA’s enforcement of penalties for member institutions that did not
follow the stricter procedures. Id.
87
Concussion Guidelines, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/health-and-safety/concussionguidelines, (last visited Feb. 8, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/VT9A-RXUL; Jake New,
HIGHER
ED
(Oct.
2,
2014),
Combating
Concussions,
INSIDE
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2014/10/02/u-michigans-response-athletesconcussion-renews-regulation-debate, archived at https://perma.cc/CT9E-FUXT. See e.g.
Settlement Decision, supra note 83, at 5–8 (outlining the NCAA’s agreed upon terms).
88
Doug Lederman, Playing Catch-up on Concussions, INSIDE HIGHER ED (July 8, 2014),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2014/07/08/ncaa-publishes-guidelinesconcussions-and-player-safety, archived at https://perma.cc/3KNV-JG4J.
89
Settlement Decision, supra note 83.
90
DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 40, at art. 3.2.4.17.1.
91
Id. The revised protocol states:
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The protocol further mandates that institutions provide all relevant
information to the committee, upon its request, concerning any incident
where a student-athlete sustained a concussion.92 Yet, the new protocol
still omits enforcement procedures and instead relies on student-athletes
to disclose concussion symptoms and member institutions to self-report
violations, a nearly impossible task considering the neurological
impairments involved in a concussion.93
3.2.4.17.1 Concussion Safety Protocol. [A] An institution shall submit
its Concussion Safety Protocol to the Concussion Safety Protocol
Committee by May 1 of each year. The protocol shall be consistent
with the Inter-Association Consensus: Diagnosis and Management of
Sport-Related Concussion Guidelines and shall include: (Adopted:
1/17/15)
(a) Policies and procedures that meet the requirements of Constitution
3.2.4.17;
(b) Procedures for preparticipation baseline testing of each studentathlete;
(c) Procedures for reducing exposure to head injuries;
(d) Procedures for education about concussion, including a policy that
addresses return-to-learn;
(e) Procedures to ensure that proper and appropriate concussion
management, consistent with best known practices and the InterAssociation Consensus: Diagnosis and Management of Sport-Related
Concussion Guidelines, is made available to any student-athlete who
has suffered a concussion;
(f) Procedures requiring that the process of identifying, removing
from game or practice, and assessing a student-athlete for a possible
concussion are reviewed annually; and
(g) A written certificate of compliance signed by the institution’s
athletics director.
3.2.4.17.1.1 Information to Concussion Safety Protocol Committee. [A]
An institution shall provide information to the Concussion Safety
Protocol Committee, as the committee may request, concerning any
incident in which a student-athlete may have suffered a concussion.
(Adopted: 1/17/15).
Id. at arts. 3.2.4.17.1 & 3.2.4.17.1.1. The Concussion Safety Protocol Committee is comprised
of six individuals, including NCAA’s Chief Medical Officer, Brian Hainline and University
of North Carolina Researcher, Kevin Guskiewicz. Jon Solomon, Why the NCAA Won’t
Adopt Concussion Penalties—At Least Not Yet, CBS SPORTS (Feb. 18, 2015, 4:58 PM),
http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/writer/jon-solomon/25073014/why-the-ncaawont-adopt-concussion-penalties----at-least-not-yet, archived at http://perma.cc/6G5JC7D4. It was created by the Power Five conferences and will only oversee those
conferences for the time being. Id.
92
DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 40, at art. 3.2.4.17.1.1.
93
See NCAA Guidelines on Head Injuries Fall Short, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2014, at A16
(criticizing the new guidelines). “The NCAA is quite willing to enforce all manner of petty
rules that have nothing to do with safety . . . [p]rotecting students should be a higher
priority.” Id. The Executive Director of the Sports Legacy Institute, Chris Nowinski, feels
the NCAA needs to reconsider its enforcement of concussion management, providing that
it “is such an urgent problem that the national governing body needs to step up . . . [it] is a

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2015

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 49, No. 3 [2015], Art. 16

1062 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

B. A Neurological Nightmare
Ohio State Defensive Lineman Kosta Karageorge is the most recent
college athlete to fall victim to the concussion’s ruthless neurological
havoc.94 Kosta, in his final cryptic message to his mother, indicated that
concussions were the cause of his suicide.95 Yet, depression and suicidal
tendencies are only two of the multitude of symptoms intrinsically
linked to concussions.96 Recognition of all concussion symptoms is
essential for proper diagnosis and treatment, which are crucial

clear situation where athletes need to be protected, and [they are] not being protected.”
Wolverton, supra note 71. Nowinski believes the NCAA needs to expand oversight of
member institutions and create harsher punishments to deter coaches from questioning
medical decisions. Id. Further advancements have been made by the Big Ten Conference,
which has enhanced its concussion protocols to include reporting requirements,
disciplinary actions with non-compliance, and greater accountability for member
institutions in the Big Ten. Jon Solomon, Big Ten will Penalize for Not Complying with
Concussion Standards, CBS NEWS (Dec. 8, 2014, 1:09 PM), http://www.cbssports.com/
collegefootball/writer/jon-solomon/24874744/big-ten-will-penalize-for-not-complyingwith-concussion-standards, archived at http://perma.cc/9Y35-TNT3. Additionally, the Big
Ten will employ an independent athletic trainer in the replay booth who can directly
contact the officials on the field. Id.
94
Rick Maese, Concussions and Depression: Questions Renewed Over Whether There’s a Link,
WASH. POST (Dec. 6, 2014), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/
concussions-and-depression-questions-renewed-over-whether-theres-a-link/2014/12/06/
1bbc8c3c-7c8e-11e4-8241-8cc0a3670239_story.html, archived at http://perma.cc/3PZZWF9X; see also Lindsey Adler, “This Disease was Eating Away at his Brain,” BUZZFEED NEWS
(Dec. 6, 2014, 1:35 PM), http://www.buzzfeed.com/lindseyadler/youth-football-braindisease-suicide#.sgwqYLMl5v, archived at http://perma.cc/TMB5-ULUT (linking Joseph
Chernach’s suicide to CTE); Madison Park, College Football Player Who Committed Suicide
Had Brain Injury, CNN (Sept. 14, 2010, 3:10 PM), http://www.cnn.com/
2010/HEALTH/09/14/thomas.football.brain/, archived at http://perma.cc/M762-6L8S
(providing Owen Thomas’ story, who was diagnosed with CTE after his suicide).
95
See Maese, supra note 94 (texting, “I am sorry if I am an embarrassment but these
concussions have my head all [expletive] up.”).
96
See Sara P. Chrisman & Laura P. Richardson, Prevalence of Diagnosed Depression in
Adolescents with History of Concussion, 54 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 582, 584 (2014) (finding
that teens who endure multiple concussions are three times more likely to suffer from
depression than those who have never had a concussion); Tracey Covassin, David Stearne
& Robert Elbin, Concussion History and Postconcussion Neurocognitive Performance and
Symptoms in Collegiate Athletes, 43 J. ATHLETIC TRAINING 119, 122–23 (2008) (elaborating on
the chemical effects of a concussion). “Recently, investigators have identified an emerging
pattern of neurocognitive decrements commonly occurring . . . after a concussion [which]
include visual-motor reaction time, memory, and attention.” Id. at 123; Mary Elizabeth
Dallas, Concussions Tied to Verbal Memory Loss in Young Athletes, HEALTHDAY (June 3, 2011),
http://consumer.healthday.com/cognitive-and-neurological-health-information-26/brainhealth-news-80/concussions-tied-to-verbal-memory-loss-in-young-athletes-653570.html,
archived at http://perma.cc/4Y4V-H2S5 (identifying decreased brain function and
cognitive processing among students who sustained a concussion).
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determinants in preventing further senseless deaths.97 Unfortunately,
concussion identification is particularly problematic because of the
inherent complexity involved in head injury diagnosis.98 Yet, the current
NCAA Concussion Policy delegates the near impossible task of
recognizing a concussion to the student-athlete.99 The physiological
trepidation an athlete endures during a head injury is understood by
explaining the epidemiology of a concussion.100
A concussion is a very enigmatic injury because it is practically
impossible to diagnose with the naked eye.101 When making a diagnosis,
medical personnel look for disturbances in the level of consciousness,

97
See Robert C. Cantu & Alissa D. Gean, Second-Impact Syndrome and a Small Subdural
Hematoma: An Uncommon Catastrophic Result of Repetitive Head Injury with a Characteristic
Imaging Appearance, 27 J. NEUROTRAUMA 1557, 1557–58 (2010) (demonstrating the
importance of proper diagnosis); Julian Bailes, Sports Concussion, NORTHSHORE UNIV.
HEALTHSYSTEM (2014), http://www.northshore.org/orthopaedics/specialties/sportsmedicine/sports-concussion/, archived at http://perma.cc/3MCK-QB97 (stressing the
critical importance of proper diagnosis so that athletes do not risk worsening symptoms or
prolonged recovery).
98
Zachary Y. Kerr et al., Disclosure and Non-Disclosure of Concussion and Concussion
Symptoms in Athletes: Review and Application of the Socio-ecological Framework, 28 BRAIN
INJURY 1009, 1009–10 (2014); see Christine M. Baugh et al., Perceived Coach Support and
Concussion Symptom-Reporting: Differences Between Freshman and Non-Freshman College
Football Players, 42 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 314, 315 (2014) [hereinafter Perceived Coach Support]
(conveying that “[s]ome studies have estimated that over 50% of concussions go
undiagnosed, in large part due to athletes failing to report symptoms” (citations omitted)).
Baugh also attributes undiagnosed concussions to lacking and unmandated coach
education. See id. at 320 (stating, “there appears to be variation in coaches’ abilities to
recognize concussion . . . [a]lthough many state laws and sport league policies recommend
coach concussion education, it is less frequently mandated”).
99
See Barbara Osborne, Principles of Liability for Athletic Trainers: Managing Sport-Related
Concussion, 36 J. ATHLETIC TRAINING 316, 316 (2001) (emphasizing that recognizing and
treating concussions is one of the most difficult problems facing even educated medical
personnel). See generally Therese A. West & Donald W. Marion, Current Recommendations
for the Diagnosis and Treatment of Concussion in Sport: A Comparison of Three New Guidelines,
31 J. NEUROTRAUMA 159, 166 (Jan. 15, 2014) (reiterating the debate surrounding proper
diagnosis and treatment of concussions).
100
See infra Part II.B (discussing the concussion). Epidemiology is defined as “the study
of the occurrence and distribution of health-related states or events in specified
populations, including the study of the determinants influencing such states, and the
application of this knowledge to control the health problems.” MIQUEL PORTA, A
DICTIONARY OF EPIDEMIOLOGY 81 (2008).
101
See Heather J. McCrea et al., Concussion in Sports, 5 SPORTS HEALTH 160–63 (2013)
(explaining that concussion diagnosis is difficult because objective measurements are
lacking); Daniel H. Daneshvar et al., The Epidemiology of Sport-Related Concussion, 30
CLINICAL SPORTS MED. 1, 2 (2012) (stating that many concussions are not recognized by
medical personnel and athletes); Paul McCrory et al., What is the Lowest Threshold to Make a
Diagnosis of Concussion?, 47 B. J. SPORTS MED. 268–71 (2013) (conveying that concussion
symptoms vary dramatically between athletes).
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confusion, and amnesia.102 After a concussion, the brain’s ability to
regulate, transmit, and send signals that control thought process is
disrupted.103 As a result, decision-making, impulse control, and problem
solving capabilities are significantly impaired.104 Moreover, the frenzied
release of brain chemicals causes headaches, memory loss, anxiety,
insomnia, and dizziness, which have been known to persist long after
the initial impact.105 A head impact also causes intracranial pressure,
thereby crushing brain tissue and cutting off the brain’s blood supply—a
potentially catastrophic and deadly occurrence.106
The effects of concussions are potentially devastating.107 Often, the
occurrence of multiple concussions is most threatening to an athlete’s

102
Christopher S. Sahler & Brian D. Greenwald, Traumatic Brain Injury in Sports: A
Review, REHAB. RES. & PRAC. 1, 2 (2012). See generally Cantu & Gean, supra note 97, at 1557–
58 (reaffirming the importance of using a computerized tomography scan (“CT scan”) to
ensure that damage is not immediately life-threatening).
103
Ivan Mulligan et al., Prevalence of Neurocognitive and Balance Deficits in Collegiate
Football Players Without Clinically Diagnosed Concussion, 42 J. ORTHOPEDIC & SPORTS
PHYSICAL THERAPY 625, 625–26 (2012); see Michelle Castillo, Contact Sports May Put Athletes
at Higher Risk of Memory Loss Even Without Concussions, CBS NEWS (Dec. 12, 2013, 2:11 PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/contact-sports-may-put-you-at-higher-risk-of-memorylearning-loss-even-without-concussions/, archived at http://perma.cc/5ENA-XU68
(finding that collegiate contact sport athletes are more likely to score lower on learning and
memory tests at the end of the season).
104
David B. Arciniegas et al., Mild Traumatic Brain Injury: A Neuropsychiatric Approach to
Diagnosis, Evaluation, and Treatment, 1 NEUROPSYCHIATRIC DISEASE & TREATMENT 311, 322–
23 (2005).
105
Eric L. Legome & Rick Kulkarni, Postconcussive Syndrome, MEDSCAPE (May 13, 2013),
http://emedicine.medscape.com/article/828904-overview, archived at http://perma.cc/
Z2TD-9NEE; see RECOVERING FROM A CONCUSSION (HEAD INJURY); CORNELL UNIV., available
at http://www.gannett.cornell.edu/cms/pdf/upload/Concussion.pdf, (last visited Sept.
18, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/UG47-LXHQ (warning that symptoms can last for
days, weeks, and even months).
106
Anne Trafton, Sensing When the Brain is Under Pressure, MIT NEWS OFFICE (Apr. 11,
2012),
http://web.mit.edu/newsoffice/2012/intracranial-pressure-monitor-0411.html,
archived at http://perma.cc/QPZ9-LQBJ; see T. Mori, Y. Katayama & T. Kawamata, Acute
Hemispheric Swelling Associated with Thin Subdural Hematomas: Pathophysiology of Repetitive
Head Injury in Sports, 96 ACTA NEUROCHIRURGICA SUPP. 40, 41 (2006) (providing that second
impact syndrome occurs because there is a lack of cerebral blood flow, which leads to
blood vessel engorgement, increased intracranial pressure, and eventual herniation).
107
See Jordan Gaines Lewis, From Sacks to Suicidality: Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy
and the NFL, SCITABLE (Nov. 21, 2013), http://www.nature.com/scitable/blog/mindread/from_sacks_to_suicidality_chronic,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/XU56-DT2V
(illustrating the suicidal tendencies accompanying CTE); Josh Levs, Steve Almasy & Joe
Sutton, Paul Oliver’s Suicide is Latest in a String Among Former NFL Players, CNN (Sept. 26,
2013, 4:14 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/25/us/former-nfl-player-suicide/, archived
at http://perma.cc/4QSX-WUVY (conveying the suicides of several NFL athletes with
CTE); Loy. Univ. Health Sys., Do Sports Concussions Really Cause Chronic Traumatic
Encephalopathy?, SCIENCEDAILY (Dec. 2, 2013), http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/
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well-being.108 Second-impact syndrome is a lethal phenomenon that
occurs when an athlete who sustains a head injury endures a second
head injury before symptoms associated with the first have fully
cleared.109 Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy (“CTE”) is a progressive
disease also found in athletes with a history of repetitive brain trauma.110
CTE can occur with even non-concussive hits to the head and can
produce severe permanent consequences including paranoia, depression,
dementia, aggression and suicidal tendencies.111 Alarmingly, NCAA
football players are three times more likely to experience CTE-like

2013/12/131202152036.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/4JFF-9YRM (demonstrating the
severity of the long-term effects).
108
See Jorge Castillo, College Athlete Died of Head Trauma, Father Says, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30,
2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/31/sports/ncaafootball/college-footballplayer-died-from-head-trauma-father-says.html, archived at http://perma.cc/JH2B-H3PJ
(illustrating the detrimental effects of second-impact syndrome); Terry Zeigler, Second
Impact Syndrome, SPORTSMD (2014), http://www.sportsmd.com/articles/id/38.aspx
#sthash.FwEr2bIp.51kcX2uH.dpbs, archived at http://perma.cc/N8LX-RS8D (providing
further information on the deadly second-impact syndrome); David X. Cifu & Craig C.
Young,
Repetitive
Head
Injury
Syndrome,
MEDSCAPE
(Mar.
27,
2014),
http://emedicine.medscape.com/article/92189-overview, archived at perma.cc/P7H3AFY8 (defining second-impact syndrome).
109
Tareg Bey & Brian Ostick, Second Impact Syndrome, WEST J. EMERGENCY MED. (Feb. 10,
2009),
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2672291/,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/Y4VC-ATPF (providing that “[i]f, within several weeks [of sustaining a
first head injury], the athlete returns to play and sustains a second head injury, diffuse
cerebral swelling, brain herniation, and death can occur [and] young, healthy patients may
die within a few minutes”); Barry Willer & John J. Leddy, Management of Concussion and
Post-Concussion Syndrome, 8 CURRENT TREATMENT OPTIONS NEUROLOGY 415, 421 (2006)
(cautioning that even those athletes without symptoms may be at risk for second-impact
syndrome).
110
See What is CTE:
Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy, SPORTS LEGACY INST.,
http://www.sportslegacy.org/research/cte/, archived at http://perma.cc/W6C6-55WU
(2013) (elaborating that the multiple impacts trigger a progressive degeneration by
stimulating the build-up of abnormal tau protein).
111
Brandon E. Gavett, Robert A. Stern & Ann C. McKee, Chronic Traumatic
Encephalopathy: A Potential Late Effect of Sport-Related Concussive and Subconcussive Head
Trauma, 30 CLINICS SPORTS MED. 179, 188 (2011); see Johna K. Register-Mihalik et al.,
Association Between Previous Concussion History and Symptom Endorsement During Preseason
Baseline Testing in High School and Collegiate Athletes, 1 SPORTS HEALTH 61, 64 (2009)
(cautioning that “college athletes with a history of multiple concussions may be at risk for
experiencing concussion-linked symptoms well beyond the acute stage of injury”); Park,
supra note 94 (stating that college athlete “[Owen] Thomas had never been diagnosed with
a concussion as far back to the age of [nine,]” yet was still diagnosed with CTE).
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symptoms than the general population.112 Unfortunately, little is known
about the onset of CTE, thus absolute prevention is nearly impossible.113
However, limiting exposure to head trauma is the most assured way
to prevent any adverse effects.114 Nevertheless, it is common practice for
an athlete to make the potentially fatal decision to ignore an injury,
especially one as complex as a concussion.115 In recent years, several
athletes have felt the insurmountable pressure to play through the pain
and have lost their lives as a result.116 A college athlete’s decision to not
disclose his concussion symptoms is largely influenced by several
competing social factors.117

112
Expert Report of Bruce Deal Regarding the Medical Monitoring Fund at 12, In re Nat’l
Collegiate Student-Athlete Concussion Injury Litig., No. 1:13-cv-09116 (N.D. Ill. July 28,
2014). It is also estimated that approximately 50–300 former college athletes will be
diagnosed per year for those whose careers were from 1956 to 2008. Id. at 13.
113
See Ann C. McKee et al., Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy in Athletes: Progressive
Tauopathy Following Repetitive Head Injury, 68 J. NEUROPATHOLOGY & EXPERIMENTAL
NEUROLOGY 709, 710 (July 2009) (providing that the severity or recurrence of impact
required to incite CTE remains unknown).
114
See Christine M. Baugh et al., Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy: Neurodegeneration
Following Repetitive Concussive and Subconcussive Brain Trauma, BRAIN IMAGING & BEHAV.
(May 3, 2012), http://www.bu.edu/alzresearch/files/2013/02/Baugh-et-al-CTE-ReviewBrain-Imaging-and-Behavior-5-2012.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/F5NL-WMCB
(describing the harm caused by repeated head trauma).
115
See Marc Lillibridge, Injured or Hurt: A Former Player’s Perspective on NFL Injuries,
BLEACHER REP. (Aug. 20, 2012), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1303698-injured-orhurt-a-former-players-perspective-on-nfl-injuries, archived at http://perma.cc/7L3X-GPD8
(discussing the stigma surrounding admitting to an injury in the NFL); Wolverton, supra
note 71 (providing that over fifty percent of collegiate athletic trainers have felt pressure to
return an injured athlete to play faster than medically appropriate); Martin Roderick, Ivan
Waddington & Graham Parker, Playing Hurt: Managing Injuries in English Professional
Football, 35 INT’L R. SOC. SPORT 165 (June 2000) (specifying that “the almost unrelenting
pressure on players to continue playing through injury exacts a heavy cost in terms of pain,
injury [and] long-term chronic disability”).
116
See, e.g., Ryan Casey, Signs Weren't Obvious in Concussion Death of Jake Snakenberg,
DENVER POST (Oct. 18, 2010, 4:16 PM), http://www.denverpost.com/ci_16358037, archived
at http://perma.cc/8S2A-WXGB (conveying that Jake Snakenberg died from a “normal
football hit” a week after sustaining a previous head injury); Andy Greder, Dassel-Cokato
Football Player in Serious Shape After Head Injury, PIONEER PRESS (Sept. 9, 2013),
http://athletictrainers.org/2013/09/09/dassel-cokato-football-player-in-serious-shapeafter-head-injury/, archived at http://perma.cc/8U6L-JTXW (stating that Luke Nelson was
in serious condition after sustaining a hit in his second game of the season); Thomas
Zambito, Montclair High School Trainer Faced Tough Questions in Football Player's 2008 Death,
STAR LEDGER (Sept. 22, 2013, 8:54 PM), http://www.nj.com/essex/index.ssf/2013/
09/ryne_dougherty_lawsuit_montclair_high_school_trainer_faced_tough_questions_in_fo
otball_players_2008.html, archived at http://perma.cc/3BZL-SKXN (providing that Ryne
Dougherty died twenty-five days after sustaining a hit during a football game).
117
See infra Part II.C (providing further explanation of the socio-ecological factors that
influence disclosure).
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C. Cognitive Russian Roulette
In the game of Russian roulette, competitors are individually
responsible for evading a potentially deadly outcome.118 Participants
often fail to comprehend the magnitude of their decision to partake in
the activity, while outside influences entice continued engagement.119 It
has been argued that a student-athlete faces a comparable impracticality
under the NCAA Concussion Policy.120 The Policy requires selfreporting of concussion symptoms, yet disclosure is inhibited by social
implications.121 A myriad of socio-ecological factors are involved in the
game of cognitive Russian roulette, hindering concussion reporting.122
The Division I Manual specifies that “[s]tudent-athletes must
acknowledge that they have received information about the signs and
symptoms of concussions and that they have a responsibility to report
concussion-related injuries and illnesses to a medical staff member.”123
Some have voiced concern over the requirement, as it is believed that
players and coaches are not in the best position to decide whether a

118
See Arnold v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 970 F.2d 360, 361 (7th Cir. 1992) (defining Russian
roulette). Russian roulette is “an act of bravado consisting of spinning the cylinder of a
revolver loaded with one cartridge, pointing the muzzle at one's own head, and pulling the
trigger.” Id.
119
See Wickman v. Nw. Nat. Ins. Co., 908 F.2d 1077, 1087 (1st Cir. 1990) (reporting that
individuals regularly participate in Russian roulette neither expecting nor intending to be
killed); People v. Hansen, 59 Cal. App. 4th 473, 476–78 (1997) (demonstrating the external
pressures on initiating and participating in a game of Russian roulette).
120
See Associated Press, NCAA Settles Head-Injury Lawsuit, Will Changes Rules for Players,
CBS NEWS (July 29, 2014, 10:20 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/ncaa-settles-headinjury-lawsuit-will-changes-rules-for-players/, archived at http://perma.cc/K2YA-RKSA
(criticizing the NCAA’s self-reporting system for concussions).
121
See infra Part II.C (exploring the social factors that hinder reporting); Kerr, supra note
98, at 1009–10 (elaborating on the socio-ecological factors involved in intercollegiate
football); Kevin Young et al., Body Talk: Male Athletes Reflect on Sport, Injury and Pain, 11
SOC’Y SPORT J. 175, 175–76 (1994) [hereinafter Body Talk] (demonstrating further reasons for
why athletes remain in play); Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 332 (7th Cir. 2012) (giving a
financial incentive to remain in play while symptomatic).
122
See infra Part II.C (illuminating the social ramifications involved in intercollegiate
football).
123
DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 40, at 11; MEDICINE HANDBOOK, supra note 56, at 64; see
Anthony S. McCaskey & Kenneth W. Biedzynski, A Guide to the Legal Liability of Coaches for
a Sports Participant's Injuries, 6 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 7, 33 (1996) (expressing the difficulty
of keeping an injured athlete from competing); see also LSU, LSU ATHLETICS 2013–2014, at
32 (2013), available at http://compliance.lsu.edu/studentathletes/Documents/handbook%
20201314.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/9X2Z-6NJ4 (reaffirming a college’s issuance of
responsibility to the athlete). “While we recognize that the medical staff plays an
important role in the identification of concussions, the student-athlete is equally
responsible for notifying the athletic training staff if they believe they may have suffered a
concussion.” Id.
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concussed athlete should return to the game.124 On an intrapersonal
level, a student-athlete may choose not to disclose concussion symptoms
either due to lack of awareness or internal pressures.125 In compliance
with the NCAA’s stipulation, nearly 90% of universities require an
athlete acknowledge his role in reporting a concussion.126 However, only
71% actually provide athletes with concussion education materials.127
Thus, athletes often fail to report concussion symptoms out of sheer
ignorance.128 In fact, a 2002 study of college athletes indicated that only
20% of those who experienced a concussion actually recognized they had
sustained the injury.129 Shortcomings in the NCAA Concussion Policy
have been criticized as playing a role in this oblivion.130
124
See NCAA Sport Science Institute, Concussion Symptoms and Return to Play: StudentAthlete Subjectivity, NCAA (Sept. 12, 2013), http://www.ncaa.org/health-andsafety/medical-conditions/concussion-symptoms-and-return-play-student-athlete, archived
at http://perma.cc/MLY9-ZAFP [hereinafter Concussion Symptoms and Return to Play]
(providing data as to the amount of athletes who report concussions). “[Forty-three]
percent of student athletes with a history of concussion reported that they had knowingly
hidden symptoms of a concussion to stay in a game; [twenty-two] percent indicated that
they would be unlikely or very unlikely to report concussion symptoms to a coach or
athletic trainer in the future.” Id. The study also found that “[m]ale athletes and athletes
with a prior history of concussion were more likely to indicate that they would not report
future concussion symptoms, despite acknowledging they had received formal education
in concussion.” Id.
125
Id.
126
Christine M. Baugh et al., Concussion Management in United States College Sports:
Compliance with National Collegiate Athletic Association Concussion Policy and Areas for
Improvement, 43 AM. J. SPORTS MED. 47, 54 (2014) [hereinafter Concussion Management]; see
DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 40, at 11 (quoting language that requires implementation of
both steps). See, e.g., UNIV. UTAH SCH. MED., SPORTS CONCUSSION MANAGEMENT PLAN 8
(2011), available at https://healthcare.utah.edu/orthopaedics/concussion-managementplan.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/DJY4-X9UG (exemplifying a member institution’s
concussion management plan). Under the plan, a student-athlete must acknowledge that it
is his responsibility to report any concussion symptoms. Id.
127
Concussion Management, supra note 126, at 54.
128
Kerr, supra note 98, at 1015. Athletes often remain in play while concussed because
they believe their head injury is not serious enough to report. Id. In one study of high
school athletes, only thirteen percent of “bell-ringer” type hits were reported because the
athlete perceived the injury to be insignificant, even though they are still capable of
producing concussive symptoms. Id. Approximately ninety percent of sport-related
concussions are considered mild and characterized by subtle symptoms. Gordon A. Bloom
et al., The Prevalence and Recovery of Concussed Male and Female Collegiate Athletes, 8 EUR. J.
SPORT SCI. 295, 296 (2008) (citing J. Scott Delaney et al., Concussions Among University
Football and Soccer Players, 12 CLINICAL J. SPORTS MED. 331 (2002)). Nevertheless, athletes
were better able to recognize they had sustained a concussion after being educated on the
issue. See Kerr, supra note 98, at 1015 (providing multiple findings that concussion
education slightly improved reporting).
129
Bloom et al., supra note 128, at 296. The majority of athletes continued to play while
symptomatic because they were not aware that the symptoms were indicative of a
concussion. Id.; see Emily Kroshus et al., NCAA Concussion Education in Ice Hockey: An
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The NCAA Division I Manual provides little guidance on substance
or delivery of the educational materials.131 In addressing this issue, the
NCAA conceded that “concussion education needs to be improved and
evaluated [to] better ensure that we are having an impact on
behavior . . . the NCAA Sport Science Institute hopes that we will
achieve this necessary cultural shift through a more robust and evidencedriven educational paradigm.”132 Nevertheless, even with proper
concussion education, some athletes still knowingly conceal their
symptoms.133 This blatant disregard is often a result of self-imposed
demands.134
An athlete’s internal pressure can cause him to set high, occasionally
unrealistic, expectations.135 As a result, athletes overexert their body in
order to optimize performance.136 Accordingly, their tenacity can

Ineffective Mandate, 48 BRITISH J. SPORTS MED. 135, 138–40 (2014) (concluding that the
NCAA’s current education system is ineffective). The Handbook offers limited guidelines
on concussion education: “[S]tudent-athletes must sign a statement in which they accept
the responsibility for reporting their injuries and illnesses to the institutional medical staff,
including signs and symptoms of concussions. During the review and signing process,
student-athletes should be presented with educational material on concussions.” MEDICINE
HANDBOOK, supra note 56, at 64.
130
Concussion Management, supra note 126, at 54 (citing Emily Kroshus et al., NCAA
Concussion Education in Ice Hockey: An Ineffective Mandate, 48 BRITISH J. SPORTS MED. 135,
138–40 (2014)).
131
Concussion Management, supra note 126, at 54; see also MEDICINE HANDBOOK, supra note
56, at 64 (articulating that “[d]uring the review and signing process, student-athletes
should be presented with educational material on concussions”).
132
Concussion Symptoms and Return to Play, supra note 124.
133
Kerr, supra note 98, at 1015; Concussion Symptoms and Return to Play, supra note 124.
College football players are significantly more likely to conceal a concussion than other
surveyed athletes. Kerr, supra. The football players indicated that, after being hit in the
head, 61% still played with concussive symptoms in a championship game, compared to
30% of other college athletes. Id.
134
Kerr, supra note 98, at 1015.
Current findings suggest that athletes may be reluctant to disclose
concussions if it results in removal from sports participation. Because
athletes may believe reporting concussions is stigmatizing, it is
essential that sports organizations utilize interventions to, first,
educate athletes on how to recognize concussion symptoms and,
second, emphasize the long-term health benefits of reporting
concussions as well as the risks of playing while concussed.
Id. (citations omitted).
135
Melinda Halpern, Managing Internal and External Pressures, GRIT PERFORMANCE (Feb.
14, 2013), http://gritperformance.com/blog/2013/2/14/managing-internal-and-externalpressures, archived at http://perma.cc/LDZ8-QH73.
136
Kerr, supra note 98, at 1018 (citing Declan Connaughton, et al., The Development and
Maintenance of Mental Toughness: Perceptions of Elite Performers, 26 J. SPORTS SCIS. 83 (2008)).
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influence how they respond to an injury.137 An athlete’s devotion to
success and perfection, coupled with a fear of failure and shame, may
cause him to ignore critical symptoms.138 Athletes are also motivated by
their desire to advance to the next level, where admitting pain suggests
weakness and tarnishes the player’s reputation.139
Injured athletes are frequently stigmatized; thus, an injury has been
known to greatly hinder the possibility of playing in the NFL.140
Recently, the NFL draft has seen a large influx of younger college
athletes.141 Student-athletes often enter the draft early to preempt any
injury that could jeopardize a possible professional career.142 It is a level
achieved by few athletes, yet most continue to compromise their mental
and physical health in an attempt to realize their aspirations.143
137
Declan Connaughton, et al., The Development and Maintenance of Mental Toughness:
Perceptions of Elite Performers, 26 J. SPORTS SCIS. 89 (2008). Connaughton and colleagues
reasoned, “having an insatiable desire and internalized motives to succeed . . . was []
assumed to influence [responses] to sport-related injuries.” Id.
138
Kerr, supra note 98, at 1018 (citing Sam S. Sagar & Joachim Stoeber, Perfectionism, Fear
of Failure, and Affective Responses to Success and Failure: The Central Role of Fear of Experiencing
Shame and Embarrassment, 31 J. SPORT & EXERCISE PSYCHOL. 602, 602–27 (2009)).
139
See Anand Veeravagu, What’s Really Killing Athletes with Concussions?, DAILY BEAST
(Dec. 26, 2013), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/12/26/what-s-killingconcussed-players-who-left-the-nfl.html,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/EPK4-5GV5
(contextualizing the pressures associated with hiding an injury). Dr. Veeravagu provides
that:
In today’s era of athletic competition where money, fame, and whole
industries are on the line, admitting pain or discomfort suggests
weakness and can have severe consequences for the player and the
team. Thus, players often rack up multiple concussions throughout
their career. Data suggests that head injuries are significantly
underreported by players, who often dismiss concussive symptoms.
These are all direct contributors to a robust concussion culture in
contact.
Id.
140
Lillibridge, supra note 115.
141
Kevin Clark, NFL Draft: College Football’s NFL Problem: Why are Underclassmen
Suddenly Leaving in Droves for the NFL Draft?, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 2, 2014, 10:24 PM),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304585004579415241023161788?m
g=reno64-wsj&url=http%3A%2F%2Fonline.wsj.com%2Farticle%2FSB1000142405270230458
5004579415241023161788.html, archived at http://perma.cc/BYK7-4BA8 (cautioning that
younger athletes are given incentives to enter the NFL draft as early as sophomore year).
142
Jason Clary, College vs. Pros: Should Athletes Leave School Early?, BLEACHER REP. (Dec.
13, 2009), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/307746-college-vs-pros-should-athletes-beallowed-to-leave-school-early, archived at http://perma.cc/8YDT-XWEF.
143
See Megan McArdle, Head Injuries Make Football a Bad Bet, BLOOMBERG VIEW (Nov. 13,
2013, 11:22 AM), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2013-11-13/head-injuriesmake-football-a-bad-bet, archived at http://perma.cc/X5HF-G3VK (cautioning that dozens
of athletes risk their health for one spot in the NFL); see also LYDIA BELL ET AL., SELFREPORTED CONCUSSION AMONG NCAA STUDENT-ATHLETES: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (Feb.
2014), available at http://ncaa.org/sites/default/files/Concussion%20%20GOALS%20Exec
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Unfortunately, outside inducements may further encourage this
behavior.144
Non-disclosure can result from environmental influences, which
include cultural implications and interpersonal relationships.145
Understandably, financial retention can induce a scholarship athlete to
conceal concussive symptoms, which may be revoked if he is unable to
play the year following an injury.146 Upon choosing a college, the
%20Summary_Feb_12_2014_FINALpost.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/N246-FLQY
(concluding that year in school and first-team status directly correlate with concussion
reporting); Michael McCrea et al., Unreported Concussion in High School Football Players:
Implications For Prevention, 14 CLINICAL J. SPORTS MED. 13, 15 (2004) (finding that motivation
not to be withheld from competition made up forty-one percent of unreported concussions
among varsity football players and disregard for seriousness made up sixty-six percent of
unreported concussions); Doug Brown, “Dangerously Excessive”: How Washington State
Football Confronted, and Didn’t Confront the First Bad News of the Mike Leach Era, DEADSPIN
(Jan. 8, 2013, 1:15 PM), http://deadspin.com/5974159/dangerously-excessive-howwashington-state-football-confronted-and-didnt-confront-the-first-bad-news-of-the-mikeleach-era, archived at http://perma.cc/U8UX-ZG4F (illuminating incentives placed on
athletes to conceal an injury).
144
See Kerr, supra note 98, at 1016 (stating, “studies support that an athlete’s decision to
disclose, as well as their general concussion knowledge, is influenced by other individuals
within a sports organization”).
145
Id.
146
Frequently Asked Questions About the NCAA, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/
frequently-asked-questions-about-ncaa, archived at http://perma.cc/SMF8-ASTM (Jan. 24,
2014); see Wolverton, supra note 71 (providing that recent studies have shown that athletes
are underreporting concussions because they do not want to risk having their scholarships
revoked); Jon Solomon, Plaintiffs Want Judge Removed in John Rock v. NCAA Scholarship Case,
CBS SPORTS (Dec. 12, 2014, 1:34 PM), http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/
writer/jon-solomon/24882488/plaintiffs-want-judge-removed-in-john-rock-v-ncaascholarship-case, archived at http://perma.cc/LU8K-WPBE [hereinafter Plaintiffs Want
Judge Removed] (relaying further information on the one-year scholarship rule and the push
to eliminate it). See generally RAMOGI HUMA & ELLEN J. STAUROWSKI, NAT’L COLLEGE
PLAYERS ASS’N, THE PRICE OF POVERTY IN BIG TIME COLLEGE SPORTS 20 (2011), available at
http://assets.usw.org/ncpa/The-Price-of-Poverty-in-Big-Time-College-Sport.pdf, archived
at http://perma.cc/Q2XP-EMA7 (demonstrating the necessity of scholarship money by
providing that “[t]hrough the NCAA, college presidents mandate impoverished conditions
for young, valuable players and throw money around to all other college sports
stakeholders when those players perform well, a formula that drives the powerful black
market that thrives at so many universities nationwide”). Since 2002, universities have had
the option to provide multi-year scholarships, though many still keep the agreements to
one year. Plaintiffs Want Judge Removed, supra. The NCAA reiterates that:
Depending on various circumstances, a school can choose not to renew
or cancel a student-athlete’s scholarship[]. The school has the choice to
reduce or cancel the scholarship at the end of the period of the award.
The school could also cancel the scholarship during the period of the
award under the following circumstances: [1] Student-athlete becomes
ineligible, [2] Student-athlete commits fraud, [3] Misconduct, [4] Quits
the team for personal reasons.
Frequently Asked Questions About the NCAA, supra.
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student-athlete signs the National Letter of Intent (“NLI”), which binds
him to the institution.147 Although the athlete is unable to retract his
commitment to the athletic program, member institutions can arbitrarily
revoke a previously made promise of financial aid under the contract.148
Likewise, the Division I Manual allows member institutions to penalize a
student athlete if he “[v]oluntarily withdraws from a sport at any time
for personal reasons” by reducing or cancelling his financial aid.149
Additionally, masculine perception and associating concussion
reporting with weakness can influence an athlete.150 The notion that
147
See Michael J. Cozzillio, The Athletic Scholarship and the College National Letter of Intent:
A Contract by Any Other Name, 35 WAYNE L. REV. 1275, 1300 (1989) (stating that “the Letter
of Intent . . . has served as a partial predicate for judicial recognition of the contractual
relationship between university and student”). See generally National Letter of Intent (NLI),
NAT’L
LETTER
INTENT
(2014),
http://www.nationalletter.org/,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/4HM5-8E8L (providing background on the NLI); see c.f. Debra D. Burke &
Angela J. Grube, The NCAA Letter of Intent: A Voidable Agreement for Minors?, 81 MISS. L.J.
265, 275 n.60 (2011) (demonstrating legal obligations imposed under the NLI); Agnew v.
NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 332 (7th Cir. 2012) (illustrating two accounts of scholarship athletes
who lost their financial aid after sustaining an injury); Sean Hanlon & Ray Yasser, "J.J.
Morrison" and His Right of Publicity Lawsuit Against the NCAA, 15 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J.
241, 283 (2008) (identifying the NLI as a form contract).
148
See Stephen F. Ross & Lindsay Berkstresser, Using Contract Law to Tackle the Coaching
Carousel, 47 U.S.F.L. REV. 709, 713–14, 726–27 (2013) (establishing inconsistency with NLI
enforcement). C.f. Sean M. Hanlon, Student Article, Athletic Scholarships As Unconscionable
Contracts of Adhesion: Has the NCAA Fouled Out?, 13 SPORTS L. J. 41, 71–72 (2006) (arguing
the National Letter of Intent is unconscionable); Johnson v. Mobil Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp.
264, 268 (1976) (finding that unconscionability is determined by considering whether a
“real and voluntary meeting of the minds” is evidenced).
149
DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 40, at art. 15.3.4.2(d); see Ben Strauss, A Fight to Keep
College Athletes from the Pain of Injury Costs, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/25/sports/a-fight-to-keep-college-athletes-from-thepain-of-injury-costs.html?_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/P2MR-RAZM (narrating
several circumstances where athletes lost their scholarship due to an injury); see, e.g.,
STUDENT-ATHLETES: FINANCIAL AID, LOUISIANA STATE UNIV. 502D: 5 (Nov. 2006), available
at http://www.lsusports.net/src/data/lsu/assets/docs/ad/policymanual/pdf/502D.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/V6W3-NMYC [hereinafter LSU STUDENT ATHLETES] (providing
that “the renewal of aid may be denied if the student-athlete: . . . [v]oluntarily withdraws
from participation in a sport for personal reasons”); Jackson v. Drake Univ., 778 F. Supp.
1490, 1493 (S.D. Iowa 1991) (construing all financial aid agreements as valid contracts);
Hysaw v. Washburn Univ. of Topeka, 690 F. Supp. 940, 946–47 (D. Kan. 1987) (defining
documents signed by a prospect as “written scholarship contracts”).
150
Sara P. Chrisman et al., Qualitative Study of Barriers to Concussive Symptom Reporting in
High School Athletics, 52 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 330, 333 (2013) [hereinafter Qualitative
Study of Barriers]; Rob Hughes, Time to Remove Coaches from Concussion Decisions, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 5, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/06/sports/soccer/time-to-removecoaches-from-concussion-decisions.html?_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/EY9N-V2SS
(specifying that society applauds risky behaviors in football). According to Hughes,
coaches and athletes are driven by adrenaline and are certainly not qualified in such
medical matters. Id. Chrisman contributes that “[a]thletes [] described times when they
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“‘real’ men play sport[s] in an intensely confrontational manner” is
engrained in contact sport athletes.151 In furthering this ideal, athletes
are often encouraged to suppress an injury.152 This behavior is
recognized as being considerably perpetrated by the coach.153 Coaches
that support injury reporting are crucial for facilitating increased team
concussion safety; an ideal that is articulated in the Division I Manual.154
The NCAA Division I Manual maintains that “[i]t is the
responsibility of each member institution to protect the health of, and
provide a safe environment for, each of its participating studentathletes.”155 Unfortunately, large salaries and sizeable performancebased bonuses incentivize most coaches.156 Further, profitability of the
athletic program and job retention can inflict undue pressure on the
coach to win, occasionally at the expense of the athlete.157 As one study
thought they were concussed, but didn’t report symptoms. They felt it was not acceptable
to leave the game . . . because it made them look weak.” Qualitative Study of Barriers, supra.
151
Body Talk, supra note 121, at 175–76 (emphasis added).
152
Sheely Complaint, supra note 72, at 7–8; Body Talk, supra note 121, at 175–76.
153
See Jesse A. Steinfeldt et al., Masculinity Socialization in Sports: Influence of College
Football Coaches, 12 PSYCHOL. MEN & MASCULINITY 247, 257 (2011) (stressing the influence
coaches have on athletes); Brian Burnsed, NCAA Mental Health Task Force Holds First
Meeting, NCAA (Nov. 26, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media
-center/news/ncaa-mental-health-task-force-holds-first-meeting, archived at http://perma.
cc/3F63-JVSS (admitting the influence that coaches have over an athlete’s mental health).
154
Perceived Coach Support, supra note 98, at 320; DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 40, at art.
2.2.3.
155
DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 40, at art. 2.2.3; see also Chris Fuhrmeister, ‘The NCAA
Denies That it Has Legal Duty to Protect Student Athletes’, SB NATION (Dec. 19, 2013, 11:09
AM), http://www.sbnation.com/college-football/2013/12/19/5227480/ncaa-concussionlawsuits-derek-sheely, archived at http://perma.cc/5L2N-ESF7 (providing the NCAA’s
position that player safety is the responsibility of member institutions). The NCAA agrees
that safety is an issue, but contends that it cannot be held liable for individual injuries. Id.
The NCAA further asserts that it “attempts to educate schools on how to properly keep
their players safe, but it's up to said schools to actually implement the proper precautions
and create a safe environment.” Id. But see MEDICINE HANDBOOK, supra note 56, at 2
(stating that student-athletes rightfully assume that it is the shared responsibility of all who
sponsor intercollegiate athletics to minimize the inherent risks of the sport).
156
Perceived Coach Support, supra note 98, at 315 (citing Steve Berkowitz et al, NCAA
Salaries, USA TODAY, http://sports.usatoday.com/ncaa/salaries (last visited Jan. 24, 2015),
archived at http://perma.cc/NB22-LP76); see also Jim Baumbach, Special Report: College
Football Coaches Salaries’ and Perks are Soaring, NEWSDAY (Oct. 4, 2014, 6:25 PM),
http://www.newsday.com/sports/college/college-football/fbs-college-football-coachessalaries-are-perks-are-soaring-newsday-special-report-1.9461669, archived at http://perma.
cc/J6Q3-FSMH (providing insight on coach incentives, including five-figure bonuses with
a bowl appearance or a requisite amount of regular season wins).
157
Mark Koba, College Football: Why Pressure to Win is So Big, CNBC (Dec. 1, 2012, 3:48
AM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/50025280#, archived at http://perma.cc/EA6F-DK6Z.
“Coaches are going to be gone much sooner than in the past if they don’t win and they’ll be
under so much pressure to recruit the best players, and the players will have to perform
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indicated, athletes admitted to receiving negative feedback from their
coach for reporting an injury.158 Others were blamed for the team’s
loss.159 However, beyond actual reprimands, an athlete’s perceived fear
of repercussions from the coach can, itself, deter disclosure of concussion
symptoms.160 Likewise, injury concealment is also effectuated through
the coach’s dominance over the team’s medical personnel.161
Under the Medicine Handbook, an institution is to employ a health
care provider to ensure the safety and well-being of student-athletes.162
It also specifies that a coach must not have a “primary hiring or firing
role” in the medical staff’s employment.163 However, a recent survey of
college athletic trainers found that nearly one-third of respondents
indicated the football coaching staff had influence over their
employment.164 As a result, trainers are admittedly pressured to
prematurely allow student-athletes to return to play faster than
medically appropriate.165 Similar to the athlete, an athletic trainer’s

well . . . [t]he competition is going to be fierce.” Id.; see also McCaskey & Biedzynski, supra
note 123, at 12 n.9 (conveying that “[b]ecause of such tort doctrines as respondeat superior,
vicarious liability, and sovereign immunity, a coach’s tortious conduct may result in
liability against the coach’s employer”).
158
Kerr, supra note 98, at 1016 (citing Qualitative Study of Barriers, supra note 147, at 330–
35).
159
Id.
160
Kerr, supra note 98, at 1017. “An often-mentioned fear of injured athletes is that they
will be ‘brushed aside’, and the loss of attention from coaches enhances the negative
consequences of injury.” R. Malinauskas, College Athletes’ Perceptions of Social Support
Provided by their Coach Before Injury and After it, 48 J. SPORTS MED. & PHYSICAL FITNESS 107,
111 (2008). Data indicates “coaches have more influence than any other factor over
whether student-athletes view their college experience as positive or negative.” Burnsed,
supra note 153.
161
Justin Rigby et al., Understanding Athletic Trainers’ Belief Toward a Multifaceted SportRelated Concussion Approach: Application of the Theory of Planned Behavior, 48 J. ATHLETIC
TRAINING 636, 640 (2013); see Wolverton, supra note 71 (illustrating the control coaches have
over medical personnel). Before the 1990’s, medical personnel often survived multiple
coaching changes, but increasing profits have allotted coaches more discretion in choosing
their staff, which for many includes medical personnel. Wolverton, supra; see also Brown,
supra note 143 (illustrating confrontation between trainers and coaches).
162
MEDICINE HANDBOOK, supra note 56, at 8.
163
Id.
164
Wolverton, supra note 71.
165
Id. Of the fifty-three who confided that they felt pressure to return a player faster than
medically necessary, forty-two stated that they felt pressure from the coach even when the
injury was a concussion. Id.; see Arrington Memo, supra note 25, at 36 (providing the
University of Georgia’s assistant athletic trainer’s observations and expressed concerns
with neglected return to play guidelines). The trainer states that “we all know that there
are times where athletes are returned to games with concussions . . . I personally have seen
an athlete knocked unconscious and return in the same quarter in recent years.” Id.
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perception of the coach can also influence return to play decisions.166
Restructuring the current hierarchy to allow medical personnel to report
directly to the health department may cure this conflict.167 Promisingly,
some programs are implementing this hypothesized model with
significant success.168 However, most continue to be plagued by injury
concealment and concussion underreporting as a result of the NCAA
Concussion Policy’s deficiencies.169
Just one year after Jordan Matthews’ tribulation, University of
Michigan quarterback Shane Morris endured a direct hit to his head in
the season opener against the University of Minnesota.170 Following the
blow, Shane unsteadily rose to his feet, stumbled, and was caught by
offensive lineman Ben Braden.171 Although he struggled to raise his
head, Shane signaled to the sideline that he did not need a

166
See generally Rigby et al., supra note 161, at 640 (attributing underreported concussions
to the medical personnel’s believed absence of authority). Under the current system,
athletic trainers “feel they lack complete authority to implement the recommended
guidelines.” Id. at 640.
167
Id. at 641. The idea is that medical personnel will benefit from being surrounded with
a support system of individuals who better understand concussions, rather than reporting
to athletic directors who likely have more of a coaches’ mentality. Id.; see Big 12 Announces
Concussion Diagnosis and Management Policy, XII (Feb. 12, 2015), http://www.big12
sports.com/ViewArticle.dbml?DB_OEM_ID=10410&ATCLID=209895746,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/V3WE-KYBA (providing the Big 12 Conferences new concussion
protocol). The Big 12 Conferences’ protocol emphasizes that coaches will not have any
influence on the unchallengeable decisions of the medical personnel. Id.
168
See generally Darrin Scheid, Room for Change, NAT’L ATHLETIC TRAINING ASS’N 10–14
(Mar. 2011), available at http://www.nata.org/sites/default/files/Collegiate-HealthcareModel-Article.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/2NG2-FULW (conveying the benefits of
moving athletic trainers from the athletic department to campus health services). Renard
Sacco, Coordinator of Sports Medicine at Kutztown University explains:
Athletic trainers, by and large, haven’t had somebody in the athletic
department to champion their cause . . . [a] big percentage of athletic
directors, are former coaches who don’t have the same view or
approach to athletic medicine as the athletic trainer or other medical
professionals. That actually hurts athletic trainers moving forward,
especially if they’re trying to get their work environment better
organized and more efficiently run.
Id. at 11.
169
See Jon Solomon, Congressman Urges NCAA to Have Concussion Penalties, CBS SPORTS
(Nov. 12, 2014, 3:13 PM), available at http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/writer/
jon-solomon/24801901/congressman-urges-ncaa-to-have-concussion-penalties, archived at
http://perma.cc/8XSE-9VVP (critiquing the NCAA’s shortcomings).
170
Drew Hallett, The Fireable Offense of Brady Hoke, SB NATION (Sept. 28, 2014, 9:07 AM),
http://www.maizenbrew.com/2014/9/28/6855989/2014-michigan-wolverines-footballfire-brady-hoke-hot-seat-shane-morris-concussion, archived at http://perma.cc/8WB9V2TM.
171
Id.
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substitution.172 He made just one more incomplete pass before being
replaced, only to return two plays later.173 When criticized for
mishandling Shane’s concussion, Michigan head coach Brady Hoke
claimed that “[Shane] wanted to be the quarterback . . . if he didn’t want
to be, he would have come to the sideline, or stayed down.”174 Coach
Hoke’s nonsensical logic, Shane Morris’ conviction to remain in the
game, and the NCAA’s noticeably absent response, all epitomize the
NCAA’s pervasively flawed Concussion Policy.175
III. ANALYSIS
The NCAA’s Concussion Policy is an unworkable solution to a
calamitous issue.176 The meticulously drafted Policy appears to allocate
the NCAA’s concussion liability to member institutions.177 In turn, the
institutions apportion responsibility of concussion recognition to the
student-athletes.178 Yet, the NCAA’s repeated promise of protection,
Id.
Mark Sandritter, Brady Hoke ‘Confident’ Michigan Acted Correctly in Playing an Injured
Shane Morris, SB NATION (Sept. 28, 2014, 9:22 PM), http://www.sbnation.com/collegefootball/2014/9/28/6860739/brady-hoke-shane-morris-concussion-injury, archived at
http://perma.cc/HGJ6-9N93.
174
Mark Snyder, Brady Hoke Questioned for Handling of Shane Morris Injury, USA TODAY
(Sept. 29, 2014, 11:41 PM), available at http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/
2014/09/28/brady-hoke-shane-morris-injury-michigan/16390915/, archived at
http://perma.cc/6BA7-8AMC.
175
See Jon Solomon, Brady Hoke Defends Actions After Shane Morris Hit to the Head, CBS
SPORTS (Sept. 29, 2014, 10:56 AM), http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/writer/jonsolomon/24730378/brady-hoke-defends-actions-after-shane-morris-hit-to-the-head,
archived at http://perma.cc/6CLC-YENS [hereinafter Hoke Defends Actions] (criticizing the
NCAA’s unenforceable plan). Solomon relays: “Even if the NCAA determined that
Michigan mishandled Morris' situation, it's not clear what, if anything, the NCAA could
do . . . [s]chools and the NCAA have been fearful of liability issues by putting in
enforceable requirements.” Id.; Paul Anderson Consulting, LLC, An ‘Appalling’ Saturday,
NFL CONCUSSION LITIG. (Sept. 28, 2014), http://nflconcussionlitigation.com/, archived at
http://perma.cc/9Q45-QMDK (expressing distaste for the NCAA, Michigan, and Brady
Hoke’s reaction). “The NCAA has failed. Michigan has failed. Brady Hoke has failed.
Shane Morris was abused. His health and safety was recklessly disregarded. And for
what? Michigan was taking a shellacking. Morris’ brain and body took a needless
beating . . . Hoke’s response punctuates why the NCAA’s concussion policy is a failure.”
Id.
176
See Wolverton, supra note 71 (“[The failed concussion system] is such an urgent
problem that the national governing body needs to step up, . . . a clear situation where
athletes need to be protected, and they’re not being protected.”) (quoting Chris Nowinske’s
criticism of the NCAA) (internal quotation marks omitted).
177
See supra note 93 and accompanying text (delegating responsibility to the member
institution under the Division I Manual).
178
See DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 40, at 11–12 (asserting that member institutions
allocate concussion diagnosis to the student-athlete); LSU STUDENT ATHLETES, supra note
149, at 32 (articulating that a student-athlete is equally as responsible for concussion
172
173
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coupled with the contractual language, instead articulates a shared
responsibility to protect the student-athlete from head injuries.179
Nevertheless, neither the member institution nor the NCAA is
upholding its duty to protect the athlete.180 In fact, both the Association
and its members unscrupulously attempt to circumvent their obligations
in order to avoid liability.181 Ironically, it is this contravention that has
imposed the very accountability the NCAA was trying to avoid.182
This Part examines the current NCAA Concussion Policy’s
inadequacy and establishes the contractual liability that arises from its
intentional defectiveness.183 First, Part III.A addresses how the NCAA’s
drafting of the Policy, coupled with its illusion of protection, established
its legal liability.184 Then, Part III.B analyzes how the NCAA’s
apportionment of accountability and ineffective implementation resulted
Although the NCAA continuously
in its failed performance.185
reaffirmed its commitment to protecting student-athletes throughout its
existence, it unfortunately systematically failed to perform its duty when
it was most essential.186

recognition as trained medical personnel); UNIV. OF MIAMI DEP’T OF ATHLETICS
CONCUSSION GUIDELINES, supra note 68, at 7 (illustrating that student-athletes are to sign a
an acknowledgment form that accepts responsibility for disclosure).
179
See infra Part III.A.1 (analyzing the contract language and extrinsic evidence that give
rise to the NCAA’s liability).
180
See Patchesky, supra note 72 (exemplifying this failure with Derek Sheely’s death);
supra note 56 and accompanying text (illustrating the Association and member institution’s
inaction).
181
See supra note 123 and accompanying text (articulating that the student-athlete is
responsible for his concussion); supra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing whether
to use shall or should so to avoid liability).
182
See infra Part III.B (explaining the NCAA’s failed performance); see also supra notes 51–
53 and accompanying text (elaborating on the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing).
183
See infra Part III (establishing how the failed plan caused the NCAA and member
institutions to breach their contractual obligations).
184
See infra Part III.A (interpreting the NCAA legislation).
185
See infra Part III.B.1 (demonstrating NCAA’s failed performance in allocating
oversight to the member institutions); infra Part III.B.2 (establishing that the NCAA
breached when it apportioned concussion recognition and disclosure to the studentathlete).
186
See supra notes 31–34 and accompanying text (conveying the history of the NCAA’s
creation); supra notes 66–92 and accompanying text (illustrating the NCAA’s continued
promise of health and safety); supra notes 64 (demonstrating the NCAA’s continued
inaction after the death of Derek Sheely); supra note 93 and accompanying text (evidencing
that the 2015 revisions still neglect enforcement).
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A. Flea Flickering a Façade
The NCAA Concussion Policy is, essentially, a fallacy.187 However,
its lack of enforcement does not negate that it is a legally binding
document.188 Thus, when the Association drafted the Policy to hold
member institutions responsible for protecting against head injuries, it
reaffirmed its commitment to safeguarding the athlete’s well-being.189 In
doing so, the NCAA promised student-athletes that they would receive
appropriate care for head injuries.190 Yet, the Association continuously
evaded enforcement and apportioned oversight of concussion
management to the very institutions that needed overseeing.191 Next,
this Note analyzes the concussion legislation to establish a third-party
beneficiary status in the student-athlete, despite equivocation in the
agreement.192
The NCAA is contractually liable to keep its commitments made to
the student-athletes under the NCAA legislation.193 However, in order
to hold the NCAA accountable for its role in the concussion legislation,
See supra notes 76–77 and accompanying text (illustrating the NCAA never intended
to enforce its policy); Hypocritical to the Core, supra note 77 (affirming that the NCAA has
never enforced its policy). The Director of Enforcement reasoned that enforcing a
suspension or penalizing a coach for playing a concussed athlete would be inappropriate.
Id.
188
See supra Part II.D (establishing that courts have held a contract exists between the
NCAA and member institutions, to which student-athletes have third-party beneficiary
status); Bloom v. NCAA, 93 P.3d 621, 623–24 (Colo. App. 2004) (providing the studentathlete’s third-party beneficiary status to the contract); Hall v. NCAA, 985 F. Supp. 782,
796–97 (N.D. Ill. E. Div. 1997) (referring to the NCAA and all members as having a
contractual relationship); see also Wolverton, supra note 71 (demonstrating that a member
institution has yet to be charged with violating the concussion policy).
189
See generally supra Part II.B (delineating the drafting process of the NCAA Concussion
Policy); Arrington Memo, supra note 25, at 33, 34, 42 (providing internal emails discussing
what language should be used in the Concussion Policy).
190
See infra Part III.A (establishing third-party beneficiary status in the student-athlete).
See generally supra text accompanying notes 66–68; 76–77 (pronouncing the NCAA’s
commitment to student-athlete safety).
191
See Hoke Defends Actions, supra note 175 (criticizing the University of Michigan for not
implementing enforceable requirements, thus jeopardizing Shane Morris’ health); see also
MEDICINE HANDBOOK, supra note 56, at 64 (providing “[a]n active member institution shall
have a Concussion Management Plan for its student-athletes”); infra Part II.C.2 (presenting
the conflicting incentives of member institutions and its agents).
192
See infra Part III.A.1 (interpreting the NCAA’s Constitution and bylaws).
193
See Bloom v. NCAA, 93 P.3d 621, 623–24 (Colo. App. 2004) (demonstrating when
liability arises); see, e.g., supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text (discussing cases that
found student-athletes have third-party beneficiary status under NCAA legislation).
“[T]he NCAA's constitution, bylaws, and regulations evidence a clear intent to benefit
student-athletes. And because each student-athlete's eligibility to compete is determined
by the NCAA, we conclude that Bloom had standing . . . to contest the meaning or
applicability of NCAA eligibility restrictions.” Bloom, 93 P.3d at 623–24.
187
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an intentional benefit must first be established.194 Thus, further
interpretation of the concussion legislation is required to determine
whether the NCAA is contractually liable under the policy.195 For this
determination, an analysis of the contract language, as well as all
extrinsic circumstances surrounding the agreement, must be
employed.196
The NCAA legislation delineates that student-athletes are correct to
assume sponsors of intercollegiate athletics will reasonably minimize
any risk of injury resulting from his participation. 197 Accordingly, the
NCAA drafted its Concussion Policy in an attempt to perform its
obligation of reasonably minimizing the inherent risk of head injuries in
intercollegiate football.198 In addition to implementing concussion
guidelines, the Association further promised that it would also enforce
its Concussion Policy by investigating and punishing members that are
in violation of the legislation.199 Accordingly, under the NCAA
Concussion Policy, member institutions are required to implement
concussion protocols established by the NCAA and abide by any
decisions the Association makes pertaining to the concussion
legislation.200 As courts have previously held, third-party beneficiary
status is evidenced if, under a promise in the NCAA legislation,
“member institutions agree to let the NCAA set the criteria and to abide
by the NCAA’s final [] decision.”201
Therefore, in drafting the
Concussion Policy, the NCAA has committed itself to ensuring student-

194
See McCarthy v. Azure, 22 F.3d 351, 362 (1st Cir. 1994) (discussing the need to
demonstrate an intentional benefit for third-party beneficiary status).
195
See Hall v. NCAA, 985 F. Supp. 782, 796–97 (1997) (distinguishing intent from
incidental).
196
See, e.g., Knelman v. Middlebury Coll., 898 F. Supp. 2d 697, 714 (D. Vt. 2012)
(explaining that both the language of the document and extrinsic circumstances are
considered to determine intent).
197
MEDICINE HANDBOOK, supra note 56, at 2.
198
See supra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing the NCAA Concussion Policy’s
initial drafting).
199
MEDICINE HANDBOOK, supra note 56, at 63.
200
See UNIV. OF MIAMI DEP’T OF ATHLETICS CONCUSSION GUIDELINES, supra note 68, at 8–9
(illustrating the acknowledgement form coaches and medical personnel must sign,
agreeing to abide by the NCAA Concussion legislation); Investigating and Reporting NCAA
Violations, supra note 44 (providing the document agents of member institutions must sign,
acknowledging their compliance with the NCAA legislation); MEDICINE HANDBOOK, supra
note 56, at 2, 63 (“A violation of Constitution 3.2.4.17 shall be considered an institutional
violation per Constitution 2.8.1; however, the violation shall not affect the student-athlete’s
eligibility.”).
201
Knelman, 898 F. Supp. 2d at 715 (citing Oliver v. NCAA, 920 N.E.2d at 200). As a result
of these requirements, student-athletes intentionally benefit; therefore, can enforce any
assurances made under the contract. Id.
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athlete well-being by implementing concussion protocol and expressly
instituting a punishment for noncompliance.202
Outside of the actual contract language, the NCAA also extrinsically
affirms its role as an organization that protects student-athletes from
head injuries.203 First, the Association was established as an oversight
and enforcement body to protect student-athletes by regulating college
football programs and ensuring that athletes were protected from fatal
head injuries.204 The NCAA has maintained its status as the gatekeeper
of safety and continued assurer of protection throughout its existence.205
Moreover, the Association continued to acknowledge its commitment to
student-athlete safety when it drafted the NCAA Concussion Policy.206
By implementing a Concussion Policy and instituting a punishment
for noncompliance, it acknowledged the criticality of concussion
management and assured that student-athletes would be protected from
such injury.207 After drafting the policy, it proclaimed that securing a

202
See generally DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 40, at 347 (committing itself to studentathlete well-being); see also McCarthy v. Azure, 22 F.3d 351, 362 (1st Cir. 1994)
(demonstrating that third-party beneficiary status arises when the contracting parties
intend to bestow a benefit); supra note 47 and accompanying text (elaborating on
circumstances necessary for determining an intentional benefit)
203
See supra Part II.A (demonstrating the control the NCAA has over member institutions
with regard to violations and penalties of student-athlete safety); see, e.g., Emails Raise
Questions, supra note 24 (illustrating the conversations between NCAA staffers when
deciding to implement a concussion policy); Letter from David Klossner, supra note 74
(conveying that student-athlete well-being is essential to the NCAA); Wolverton, supra note
71 (providing language from the NCAA that under no circumstances should an athlete
return to play the same day).
204
See Smith, supra note 22, at 10–11 (providing a historical background of college
football violence); CROWLEY, supra note 23, at 9 (articulating that the NCAA was created to
protect college athletes from football deaths).
205
See
NCAA
Sports
Science
Institute,
Health
and
Safety,
NCAA,
http://www.ncaa.org/health-and-safety, (last visited Mar. 15, 2015), archived at
http://www.ncaa.org/health-and-safety (conveying that the NCAA Sports Science
Institute “is devoted to . . . [the] best practice guidelines that will benefit the safety,
excellence and wellness of the intercollegiate student athlete”).
206
See supra notes 71–75 and accompanying text (showing the correspondence between
Dr. Klossner and Kristen Sheely). In his 2012 letter, Dr. Klossner asserted that one of the
NCAA’s core missions is to provide student-athletes with a safe environment for
competition. Letter from David Klossner, supra note 74; supra notes 86–88 and
accompanying text (evidencing the NCAA’s updated guidelines to improve concussion
safety).
207
See supra note 80 and accompanying text (evidencing that the policy was implemented
as a result of external pressure to protect the athlete); supra Part II.A (demonstrating the
control the NCAA has over member institutions with regard to violations and penalties);
see, e.g., Emails Raise Questions, supra note 24 (illustrating the conversations between NCAA
staffers when considering the Concussion Management Plan and evidencing its reluctance
to accept liability).
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safe environment for student-athletes was one of its “core principles.”208
Moreover, the NCAA further reaffirmed this commitment when it
amended the Concussion Policy to enact more stringent guidelines.209 In
doing so, the NCAA further dedicated itself to defending the studentathletes’ well-being, under the guise of legislating its members.210 Thus,
evidencing its intent to ensure student-athletes are protected under the
NCAA Concussion Policy.211
Correspondingly, although the NCAA Concussion Policy does not
affect eligibility, student-athletes still stand to directly benefit from its
performance.212 Without enforcement of the contractual promises, a
student-athlete is left to not only recognize when he sustained a
concussion, but also to convey this information to an often unreceptive
coach.213 This type of self-reporting, without safeguards, leaves the
student-athlete susceptible to unreasonable punishments, aggravated
injuries, and possibly even death.214 Accordingly, enforcement of the
contractual promises would undoubtedly directly benefit the studentathlete; thus, creating third-party beneficiary status in the athlete and
imposing a duty on the NCAA to perform its contractual obligations
under the NCAA Concussion Policy.215
Letter from David Klossner, supra note 74.
See supra note 84 and accompanying text (providing the revised NCAA Concussion
Policy).
210
See DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 40, at 347 (committing itself to the student-athlete’s
well-being).
211
See Hall v. NCAA, 985 F. Supp. 782, 796–97 (1997) (conveying determinative factors of
incidental and intentional benefits). But see NCAA Guidelines on Head Injuries Fall Short,
supra note 93, at A16 (denouncing the NCAA’s newly drafted guidelines for lacking
oversight and enforcement); Strauss, supra note 86 (illustrating Judge Lee’s concern with
the NCAA’s enforcement of its concussion policy).
212
See MEDICINE HANDBOOK, supra note 56, at 63 (“violation shall not affect the studentathlete’s eligibility”); see also supra Part II.B (illustrating the devastating effects of a
concussion and the importance of proper diagnosis and treatment). It could be argued that
the Policy purposefully omitted any negative effect on eligibility to avoid legal liability, as,
to date, courts have only found third-party beneficiary status when eligibility is affected.
See Knelman v. Middlebury Coll., 898 F. Supp. 2d 697, 715 (D. Vt. 2012) (stating that thirdparty beneficiary status under the NCAA legislation is confined to eligibility claims).
213
See supra note 101 and accompanying text (demonstrating the impossibility of
concussion diagnosis, even for an educated medical personnel); supra notes 158–61
(providing the conflicting incentives of college coaches).
214
See supra Part II.C (illustrating the impossibilities student-athletes face without NCAA
oversight); see also supra note 75 and accompanying text (demonstrating how the NCAA’s
inaction attributed to Derek Sheely’s death).
215
See Wolverton, supra note 71 (articulating the importance of enforcement); supra note
50 and accompanying text (affirming that upon establishing intent, third-party beneficiaries
may seek to enforce the contract after the rights vest). In the present case, these rights
vested with the student-athlete’s signed affirmation that he has read the NCAA Division I
Manual and acknowledges he is responsible for disclosing concussion symptoms. See
208
209
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Unfortunately, the NCAA’s performance has been noticeably
flawed.216 When the Association attempted to delegate its duty to the
member institutions, it created an inconsistent system of protection.217
First, the NCAA both negligently allowed noncompliance and
knowingly ignored its promise of protection by declaring that it would
punish those who systematically violated the Policy while, in practice,
never actually investigating even seemingly blatant disregard.218
Further, the NCAA abandoned its duty to protect student-athlete’s wellbeing by delegating responsibility of concussion recognition, diagnosis,
and disclosure to the student-athlete; therefore, deviating from its
express promise, as well as its implied duty of good faith and fair
dealing under the contract.219
B. Poor Performance
Illogicalities arise when looking at the NCAA Concussion Policy.220
A member institution is charged with creating and implementing a plan,
while monitoring itself to assure it is not in violation of the policy.221 In
turn, an athlete is responsible for recognizing, diagnosing, and disclosing
his concussion, which is challenging even to trained medical
personnel.222 Accordingly, contradicting incentives of coaches, athletic

UNIV. OF MIAMI DEP’T OF ATHLETICS CONCUSSION GUIDELINES, supra note 68, at 7 (providing
an example of the acknowledgement form). The student-athletes rights may additionally
vest if he is injured because of his detrimental reliance on the NCAA’s promise of
protection or upon filing a lawsuit. Olson v. Etheridge, 686 N.E.2d 563, 570 (1997).
216
See supra notes 73–74 (documenting NCAA agents’ statements that the organization
has no intention of enforcing the legislation, thus protecting the athlete).
217
See NCAA Guidelines on Head Injuries Fall Short, supra note 94, at A16 (criticizing the
new guidelines, while arguing that “[p]rotecting students should be a higher priority”);
Wolverton, supra note 71 (illustrating that oversight is lacking); supra note 172 and
accompanying text (exemplifying its inconsistency).
218
See Sheely Complaint, supra note 72, at 23 (quoting NCAA’s Director of Enforcement
that only “systematic or blatant disregard for the plan that would indicate a lack of
institutional control”); infra Part III.B.1 (elaborating on the impracticality of a selfmonitoring system); see also Patchesky, supra note 72 (demonstrating that neither the school
nor the NCAA investigated Derek Sheely’s death).
219
See supra Part II.B.1 (providing background on contract analysis); infra Part III.B.2
(analyzing the NCAA’s disregard for student-athlete safety).
220
See supra Part II.C (demonstrating the conflicting incentives of the coaches and
student-athletes).
221
See MEDICINE HANDBOOK, supra note 56, at 8; supra notes 64–68 and accompanying text
(discussing the self-reporting system); Emails Raise Questions, supra note 24 (illustrating that
creations of plans are arbitrary and that inconsistency arises from member institutions
having this responsibility).
222
See infra Part III.B.2 (elaborating on the impracticality of allocating responsibility to the
student-athlete).
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trainers, and student-athletes impede success of the current Policy.223
Therefore, while a properly implemented system may have sufficed for
acceptable performance of the NCAA’s “core mission,” the intentionally
vague and indiscriminately enforced plan instead constitutes inadequate
performance.224
1.

Intentional Grounding

As a response to societal pressure, the NCAA scrupulously redrafted
its legislation to include a guise of protection, yet never actually intended
to implement its enforcement responsibility.225 Although the NCAA is
ordinarily the monitoring and enforcement body of college athletics, its
Concussion Management Policy has no reliable system to ensure that
member institutions are conducting concussion screening or following
The NCAA has instead
their Concussion Management Plans.226
contended that enforcement is the responsibility of the member
institution.227 However, the member institution is not likely in the best
position to monitor itself for concussion management.228 Thus, several

223
See supra Part II.C (discussing the implications that arise from the conflicting
incentives).
224
See Letter from David Klossner, supra note 74 (relaying that providing a safe
environment for the student-athlete is part of the NCAA’s “core mission”); Emails Raise
Questions, supra note 24 (contending that the NCAA has yet to, nor does it have any intent
to, actually enforce or punish an institution for noncompliance).
225
See Arrington Memo, supra note 25, at 33–34 (demonstrating the NCAA’s discussion of
the pressure to implement a policy); Emails Raise Questions, supra note 24 (quoting the
NCAA’s Director of Enforcement). See generally RODGER GOODELL, 2013 OFFICIAL PLAYING
RULES OF THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE 48 (2013), available at http://static.nfl.com/
static/content/public/image/rulebook/pdfs/2013%20-%20Rule%20Book.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/NTA9-PSFB (defining intentional grounding). “It is a foul for intentional
grounding if a passer, facing an imminent loss of yardage because of pressure from the
defense, throws a forward pass without a realistic chance of completion.” Id.
226
Vaughan, supra note 67 (conveying that member institutions still have discretion as to
enforcement); Emails Raise Questions, supra note 24 (demonstrating that the NCAA has no
intent to enforce the policy).
227
MEDICINE HANDBOOK, supra note 56, at 2; see NCAA’s Concussion Culture Rooted in
Denial, supra note 71 (quoting the NCAA Director of Enforcement that “it would not be
appropriate for enforcement to suspend or otherwise penalize a coach . . . even if the
student-athlete was required to participate after having been diagnosed”); Wolverton,
supra note 71 (citing the NCAA’s Chief Medical Officer’s contention that the NCAA has no
authority to demand implementation of its concussion policy).
228
See Marsh & Robbins, supra note 55, at 668–69 (contending that athletic departments
often afford football programs greater leniency because of their profitability); McCaskey &
Biedzynski, supra note 123, at 12 n.9 (finding that member institutions may be held liable
for the tortious conduct of the coach).
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contradictions arise when considering the NCAA’s attempted
enforcement of its concussion management policy.229
Since the NCAA Concussion Policy’s implementation, a member
institution has yet to report a violation to the NCAA, absent any public
awareness.230 Presumably, the institution does not want to show lack of
institutional control, nor does it want to be charged with a possible
infraction.231 Similarly, an institution could likely be subjected to
additional litigation if it were to report a negligent coach; thus,
incentivizing it to conceal violations of its concussion policy, regardless
of its commitment to the NCAA.232
Likewise, coaches and medical personnel are expected to report any
possible infraction, yet both have contradictory abilities and interests.233
Many coaches are unable to recognize a concussion due to unmandated
concussion education.234 Therefore, coaches may unwittingly allow a
concussed player to remain in play, naïvely jeopardizing the athlete’s
well-being.235 Assuming the coach is properly educated in concussion
management, he may nevertheless be deterred from disclosure by salary
increases or possible termination of employment.236 As a result, the
coach often is more incentivized by winning than by ensuring an
athlete’s safety.237
Moreover, although, medical personnel are undoubtedly the most
medically qualified in concussion diagnosis, yet unfortunately they, too,
have conflicting interests.238 Athletic trainers often feel pressure from

229
See supra Part II.C (providing further discussion on the contradictions present in
college football).
230
See supra note 71 and accompanying text (discussing the failed reporting system).
231
Marsh & Robbins, supra note 55, at 668.
232
McCaskey & Biedzynski, supra note 123, at 12 n.9 (maintaining that member
institutions may also be liable for the coaches’ actions).
233
See LSU STUDENT ATHLETES, supra note 149, at 32 (allotting responsibility to the
athlete); UNIV. OF MIAMI DEP’T OF ATHLETICS CONCUSSION GUIDELINES, supra note 68, at 7
(providing the Concussion and Injury Reporting Acknowledgement Student-Athlete Concussion
Statement that each athlete is to sign, indicating he accepts responsibility for disclosure);
UNIV. UTAH SCH. MED., supra note 123, at 8 (demonstrating that disclosure of concussion
symptoms is the athlete’s responsibility).
234
Perceived Coach Support, supra note 98, at 320.
235
See id. (conveying the criticality of a coach’s concussion education). Baugh affirms,
“Ensuring that [coaches] have the knowledge to positively affect the concussion
identification and management process is critical.” Id.
236
See Baumbach, supra note 156 (conveying that coaches are often influenced by bonuses
and salary increases).
237
Id. See generally Hughes, supra note 150 (contending a coach is often driven by
adrenaline, thus unable to make qualified medical decisions).
238
See Wolverton, supra note 71 (discussing the medical staff’s subordinate position);
Rigby et al., supra note 161, at 640 (demonstrating the conflicting interests of the medical
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coaches to return an athlete to play quicker than medically
appropriate.239 Additionally, employment hierarchy complicates returnto-play decisions as many coaches have influence over the personnel’s
employment.240 Therefore, the medical personnel are forced to weigh
employment retention against the student-athlete’s health—a conflict
that inhibits the athletic trainer from effectively performing his duties.241
Accordingly, a member institution is unfortunately incapable of selfpolicing with regard to concussion management.242
Thus, the NCAA failed to perform its duty when it delegated
member institutions the responsibility to introduce, implement, and
enforce the Concussion Policy.243 Although self-reporting is the standard
enforcement system of the NCAA, the Association failed its duty by
never actually requiring execution of the plan.244 In fact, despite several
athletes sustaining life-altering head injuries and others succumbing to
their concussion, the NCAA has yet to investigate any of these
incidents.245 The Association had a duty to perform its promise of
protecting student-athletes, yet it failed by createing a knowingly flawed
system that delegated oversight to member institutions and made
student-athletes responsible for concussion reporting.246
2.

Institutions Call an Audible

Unfortunately, the NCAA also failed to perform when it
recommended allotting the responsibility of concussion diagnosis to the
most vulnerable party in the contractual agreement.247 Student-athletes
personnel); supra notes 162–69 and accompanying text (elaborating on the conflictions of
the medical personnel).
239
Wolverton, supra note 71.
240
Id.
241
See id. (providing the conflictions that prevent athletic trainers from removing an
athlete from play if medically appropriate).
242
See generally Wolverton, supra note 71 (illustrating the member institution’s inability to
police concussions).
243
See supra note 80 and accompanying text (demonstrating the NCAA’s motivation
behind implementing a plan, while allotting responsibility of its enforcement to the
member institutions).
244
See Sheely Complaint, supra note 72, at 23–24 (quoting Chris Strobel’s admission that
the NCAA does not enforce the concussion policy).
245
See, e.g., Patchesky, supra note 72 (providing that every authority, including the
NCAA, failed Derek Sheely).
246
See generally MEDICINE HANDBOOK, supra note 56, at 64 (demonstrating the
apportionment of accountability); supra note 77 and accompanying text (illustrating the
NCAA’s desire to remove itself from any liability).
247
See DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 40, at 11–12 (quoting the NCAA Concussion Policy
that it is the responsibility of the student-athlete to acknowledge he has received the proper
forms and that he has the duty to report a concussion to medical personnel); supra Part II.C
(illustrating the conflicting incentives of the student-athlete).
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were designated the important task to self-diagnose and report a
concussion.248 However, several competing factors play into the athlete’s
ability to fulfill its role.249 Self-incentives and outside forces deter an
athlete from guaranteeing his health and safety is protected.250
Nevertheless, the NCAA still determined the student-athlete was in the
best position to fulfill the most critical role under the contract.251
The current Concussion Policy mandates that student-athletes
acknowledge it is their responsibility to report concussion-related
injuries to a medical staff member.252 However, an athlete is the
individual least able to make an informed diagnosis.253 First, studentathletes receive inconsistent education on concussion diagnosis and
management.254 Moreover, the student-athlete is incentivized by fear of
scholarship loss, desire to play in the NFL, and need to maintain his
masculine ideology.255 All create a confliction unique to the studentathlete, hindering his ability to perform the obligation imposed on him
by the NCAA.256
Arguably, student-athletes are uneducated as to prevention,
diagnosis, treatment, and long-term effects of head injuries.257 The
NCAA publishes concussion guidelines in its Medicine Handbook, yet it
fails to distribute the publication to the athletes.258
Thus, the
responsibility to educate the athletes is left to the discretion of the

DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 40, at 11–12.
See supra notes 123–54 (detailing the conflictions of the student-athlete, which include
his desire to play professionally, to uphold his masculinity, and to maintain his
scholarship).
250
See supra note 113 (listing athletes whose lives were permanently impacted from
concussions).
251
DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 40, at 11–12.
252
MEDICINE HANDBOOK, supra note 56, at 64; see LSU STUDENT ATHLETES, supra note 149,
at 32 (affirming this responsibility); UNIV. OF MIAMI DEP’T OF ATHLETICS CONCUSSION
GUIDELINES, supra note 68, at 7 (conferring responsibility on the athlete).
253
See Concussion Symptoms and Return to Play, supra note 124 (demonstrating an athlete is
not likely to disclose a concussion “despite acknowledging they had received formal
education in concussion”); Kerr, supra note 98, at 1015 (providing that football players are
more likely than other athletes to remain playing after being concussed).
254
See MEDICINE HANDBOOK, supra note 56, at 2 (illustrating that the NCAA Concussion
Policy, although demonstrates the signs and symptoms of a concussion, is not distributed
to student-athletes); Kroshus, supra note 126 (finding that the education system is arbitrary
and ineffective).
255
See Kerr, supra note 98, at 1009–18 (providing the socio-ecological influences on
concussion reporting).
256
See supra Part II.C (providing further context on the student-athlete dichotomy).
257
Concussion Symptoms and Return to Play, supra note 124.
258
See MEDICINE HANDBOOK, supra note 56, at 2 (omitting student-athletes from the
distribution list).
248
249
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member institution.259 However, there is no enforcement mechanism to
ensure the member institutions are actually complying with the NCAA’s
required guidelines.260 Therefore, the member institutions arbitrarily
decide not only whether to educate the athletes, but also to what extent
the athletes should be educated.261 However, even with proper
education and the recently enhanced media coverage of the potential
catastrophic results of concussions, student-athletes are still not in the
best position to appreciate the risk.262
Assuming an athlete has been educated on the devastating effects of
a head injury, he is unlikely to willfully remove himself from
competition.263 Concussion symptoms alone produce a neurological
state of confusion, delayed cognitive ability, and impairment of problem
solving capability; therefore, physiologically hindering an athlete’s
ability to make a sound health decision.264 Moreover, an athlete rarely
considers the long-term repercussions of his decisions in the heat of
competition.265 Yet, unfortunately, the most significant consequences of
concussions often arise much later in life.266 Therefore, it is unlikely that
an athlete is considering the long-term risk of ‘shaking it off’ with the
short-term benefits of remaining in the competition.267 This is especially
true as athletes are incentivized by football-contingent scholarships, NFL
expectations, and masculine ideology.268

See Fuhrmeister, supra note 155 (demonstrating the NCAA contends that it “attempts
to educate schools on how to properly keep their players safe, but it’s up to said schools to
actually implement the proper precautions and create a safe environment”).
260
See Emails Raise Questions, supra note 24 (delivering that the NCAA Concussion Policy
remains unenforced, despite evidence of enforcement in the language); Vaughan, supra
note 67 (establishing the lack of enforcement).
261
See id. (illustrating that due to this lack of enforcement and the NCAA’s admitted
powerlessness, the member institutions can arbitrarily do what they wish without
repercussions).
262
See Concussion Symptoms and Return to Play, supra note 54 (illustrating that studentathletes will admittedly remain in play even though he has been educated as to the
negative side effects).
263
Id.
264
See supra notes 103–04 and accompanying text (demonstrating the immediate effects of
a concussion).
265
See Kerr, supra note 98, at 1015 (explaining that athletes often remain in play while
concussed because they do not appreciate the head injury’s seriousness).
266
See supra notes 107–13 (articulating the long-term effects of concussion and illustrating
the devastating effects of chronic traumatic encephalopathy).
267
See generally supra note 128 and accompanying text (illustrating an athlete’s disregard
of the significance of his head injury).
268
See supra Part II.C (elaborating further on the student-athlete’s conflictions).
259
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A student-athlete’s lack of control over his financial situation further
impedes concussion disclosure.269 Student-athletes’ are often given
scholarships that are conditioned upon participation in the sport and
considered binding on the athlete.270 As a result, athletes are forced to
participate, unable to withdraw from the sport even if it is in his best
interest.271 Foregoing a scholarship is simply not a realistic option for the
athlete who is only able to attend college because of financial aid.272
Moreover, an athlete is further confined by the National Letter of Intent,
which compels an athlete to remain at his particular institution for at
least one year.273 Thus, if an athlete has a coach who is unwilling to
implement a concussion plan, which compromises his safety, the athlete
is unable to transfer without sacrificing his scholarship.274
Furthermore, the NCAA’s delegation of responsibility is illogical
because student-athletes often hide injuries due to the stigma attached.275
Athletes have been known to continue playing, despite an injury, out of
fear placed upon them by a coach.276 Student-athletes overwhelmingly
269
See Huma, supra note 143 (arguing that the NCAA and college presidents create
conditions for the student-athletes so that they remain indebted to both institutions).
270
See Frequently Asked Questions About the NCAA, supra note 144 (explaining that
Universities can cancel athletic scholarships at anytime if the athlete “[q]uits the team for
personal reasons”); see also Cozzillo, supra note 147, at 1300 (conveying that several courts
have held the NLI is binding on the student-athlete); Wolverton, supra note 71 (stating that
concussion underreporting is attributable to an athlete’s fear of having his scholarship
revoked).
271
See generally DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 40, at 196 (conveying that member
institutions can reduce or cancel financial aid for voluntarily withdrawing from a sport for
personal reasons); LSU STUDENT-ATHLETES, supra note 146, at 5 (demonstrating language
from the member institution that allows it to revoke a student-athlete’s scholarship).
272
Huma, supra note 143; see also Taylor Branch, The Shame of College Sports, ATLANTIC
(Sept. 7, 2011, 11:28 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/10/theshame-of-college-sports/308643/, archived at http://perma.cc/8ZHJ-H3EG (recognizing
that most of these athletes are intentionally impoverished).
273
See Burke & Grube, supra note 147 (providing that under the National Letter of Intent
a student-athlete is unable to retract his commitment to the athletic program without the
risk of losing his scholarship and being penalized for breaching the agreement); Plaintiffs
Want Judge Removed, supra note 146 (describing a movement to eliminate the one-year
scholarship agreement to alleviate pressure on the athlete).
274
See DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 40, at 196 (indicating that an athlete cannot leave
for voluntary reasons or his scholarship can terminated).
275
See Kerr, supra note 98, at 1015 (relaying that “athletes may believe reporting
concussions is stigmatizing”); Lillibridge, supra note 115 (illustrating that an injury has a
stigma attached to it at any level and athlete’s often hide their injured status as a way to
continue playing without repercussions).
276
See Brown, supra note 143 (demonstrating the fear coaches attempted to instill in their
athletes by threatening to cut an athlete from the team if he got hurt); Burnsed, supra note
150 (indicating that coaches have more influence over any other factor as to whether the
college athlete perceives his experience as positive or negative); Steinfeldt, supra note 153,
at 257 (warning of the influence that coaches have on their athletes). C.f. Sheely Complaint,
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report that they have previously not disclosed a concussion in fear of
being removed from a game and ultimately losing their starting spot.277
Certainly, a demotion in position also jeopardizes an athlete’s chance of
being recruited by the NFL.278 Competitiveness, societal influences, and
proper education all interfere with the player’s ability to properly
diagnose and remove himself from the competition; yet, the NCAA
continues to unreasonably place responsibility on the student-athlete to
voluntarily diagnose and disclose his concussion.279
The NCAA attempted to avoid contractual liability by distancing
itself from the implementation of its Concussion Policy.280 However, the
NCAA evidenced its intent to protect student-athletes from head injuries
in the contract terms and in its actions.281 Nevertheless, the Association
knowingly delegated this duty to the member institutions that have
conflicting motivations.282 Therefore, although the institutions are
required to ensure the NCAA Concussion Policy is properly
implemented, they are instead actually perpetuating its indifference.283
In turn, the member institutions, as encouraged by the NCAA, allot
responsibility of voluntary concussion disclosure and diagnosis to the
very individuals that need protection.284 It is because of the illogical
allocation of its responsibility that the NCAA inevitably breached.285

supra note 72 (giving an example of a team policy that threatened loss of playing time for
disclosing an injury).
277
See Malinauskas, supra note 160 (finding that injured athletes frequently cite fear of
being brushed aside by coaches as a negative consequence of injury); see also Brown, supra
note 143 (exemplifying this by elaborating on the conditions at Washington State where
there was a feeling of punishment for being injured; thus, an athlete would frequently
“hide his injury because he [did not] want to lose his spot”).
278
See Lillibridge, supra note 115 (delivering that the same stigmatization is true of
injuries in the NFL where club executives would “avoid players with that label like the
plague”).
279
See supra note 91 (providing the revised concussion policy, which still instills that
student-athletes are responsible for diagnosis, without ensuring any safeguards); supra Part
II.C (revealing the student-athlete’s contradicting incentives).
280
See supra notes 77–80 and accompanying text (displaying the NCAA’s discussion
regarding how to best avoid liability while still implementing a plan).
281
See supra Part III.A (articulating further analysis as to the NCAA’s promise to protect
student-athletes).
282
See supra Part III.B.1 (assessing the NCAA’s delegation of duty to the member
institutions).
283
See supra Part III.B.2 (illustrating that the member institutions apportioned diagnosis
and concussions to the student-athletes, as encouraged by the NCAA).
284
See DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 40, at 11–12 (apportioning liability to the student
athlete under the NCAA Concussion Policy); LSU STUDENT ATHLETES, supra note 123, at 32
(allocating recognition and disclosure to the athlete); UNIV. OF MIAMI DEP’T OF ATHLETICS
CONCUSSION GUIDELINES, supra note 68, at 7 (exhibiting that each student-athlete must sign
an acknowledgement of his responsibility); UNIV. UTAH SCH. MED., supra note 123, at 8
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IV. CONTRIBUTION
The NCAA created the dichotomy that failed Jordan Matthews. In
establishing a loosely drafted Concussion Policy, the Association
affirmed its commitment to safeguarding the student-athlete’s wellbeing. However, it purposefully negated its promise of protection by
delegating concussion recognition, diagnosis, and disclosure to those
who were least able to fulfill the requirement, while doing little to ensure
implementation.286 By drafting a system that mandated oversight and
enforcement, while refusing to monitor its enforcement, the NCAA
indisputably failed the student-athletes. Correspondingly, redrafting
and reimplementation is necessary to guarantee that the NCAA no
longer violates its contractual obligations and, most importantly, that the
student-athletes are no longer placed in imminent peril.
A. The Game Plan
The NCAA’s Concussion Policy must first be revised so that an
athlete’s eligibility is affected by nondisclosure. Under the current
policy, various socio-ecological influences incentivize athletes to refrain
from disclosing concussion symptoms. Conditioning eligibility on
disclosure will instead persuade an athlete to reveal even the slightest
indication of a concussion. It will additionally eliminate an athlete’s fear
of retaliation for disclosing an injury and resolve any threat to his
playing position. Moreover, it will ensure that a concussed athlete is
removed from play for the appropriate time in order to guarantee he is
fully healed from his head injury.
The redrafting would simply change language from “violation of
Constitution 3.2.4.16 shall be considered an institutional violation per
Constitution 2.8.1; however, the violation shall not affect the studentathlete’s eligibility” to a violation of Constitution 3.2.4.16 shall be
considered an institutional violation per Constitution 2.8.1; additionally,
violation of such shall affect the student-athlete’s eligibility. Under the
redrafted policy, only intentional nondisclosure will be penalized and
will not apply to an athlete who unwittingly fails to disclose his
symptoms. This will guarantee that an athlete is not punished for a
member institution’s failure to provide adequate education. Moreover,
(affirming the student-athlete’s responsibility); see also supra Part III.B.2 (evidencing a need
to protect student-athletes).
285
See generally Bernard v. Rockhill Dev. Co., 734 P.2d 1238, 1240 (Nev. 1987) (defining a
breach of contract as a “material failure of performance of a duty arising under or imposed
by the agreement”).
286
See DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 40, at 11–12 (demonstrating that enforcement is
delegated to institutions).
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the athlete shall disclose his symptoms to independent medical
personnel who are present at every game, as further established in the
Proposed Concussion Policy.
Second, an unaffiliated medical specialist, such as an athletic trainer,
should be on the sidelines at every NCAA sanctioned event to oversee
all potential concussion cases during gameplay. This individual would
have no attachment to any member institution and would be required to
remove players that exhibit signs of a concussion from the game. The
independent medical specialist would have unquestioned authority over
any individual within the athletic programs and would receive
compensation from the NCAA. The compensation would constitute a
small fee in terms of annual revenues produced by massive televisions
and radio broadcasting contracts and could be implemented as a
provision of those contracts. Moreover, the independent medical
specialist would not eliminate medical personnel affiliated with the
team, but would act as a monitoring body at each game to ensure that all
of the presently conflicting incentives are reduced and possibly
eliminated.
Finally, a systematic revision of the NCAA’s enforcement branch
must occur to ensure compliance with the Proposed Policy. The NCAA
should first undertake a rigorous annual scientific evaluations of rules,
techniques, and standards in reducing concussions. Additionally, the
NCAA should develop a board of unbiased experts from various health
fields including physicians, public health specialists, neuropsychologists,
and various other research specialists to review all current protocols.
The panel’s responsibilities would include compiling the most current
data on concussions to implement stringent management systems on the
field, as well as off the field treatments. The panel will be funded, each
year, by contributions from member institutions as an increase in its
membership fee. The institutions will be required to pay a percentage
deemed appropriate based upon the annual revenue of its football
program. Thus, this model will allow contributions without crippling
smaller programs’ athletic budgets.
The current design and regulation of the NCAA Concussion Policy is
indifferent at best. The inherent nature of a concussion and the culture
of football deter athletes from making informed, voluntary decisions
about their health. Moreover, teams are likely to adhere to the pressure
of coaches and a desire to win without any repercussions from the
NCAA. The Proposed Policy will increase the likelihood of both
disclosure and treatment of head injuries, saving an athlete from a
potentially life threatening hit. Additionally, employing independent
medical personnel at each game will assure that concussion diagnosis
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and treatment is allocated to an individual best able to make an informed
decision. Finally, an independent governing body will guarantee that
the proposed policy is being implemented and that those in violation are
in fact subject to penalties.
B. Defensive Strategies
Several arguments may arise in opposition of this Proposed Policy.
First, opponents may argue that the Policy will be ineffective because
athletes will continue to be persuaded by their coach, as well as their
own internal aspirations and ideology, regardless of eligibility
implications. Opponents may further contend that coaches ultimately
retain discretion over playing time, therefore creating an additional
impediment by forcing an athlete to sit out for possibly a minor injury
while additionally risking his spot on the team. However, this is
inaccurate.
While an athlete will likely always retain the drive to remain in play
regardless of any detrimental health consequences, the proposed policy
seeks to counteract of this mentality by creating a system that
incentivizes an athlete to disclose concussion symptoms. This is
effectuated not only through a risk of losing eligibility, but also through
the implementation of an independent medical authority with ultimate
discretion. Additionally, if an athlete does properly disclose his
symptoms, he is only removed from play if it is determined that he has
sustained a concussion. Therefore, it is assured that the athlete is
receiving adequate post-concussion care and any effect on playing time
is an inferior concern. Finally, a coach who retaliates against an athlete
for concussion disclosure will ultimately be in violation of the Proposed
Policy by hindering its implementation; thus, subject to penalties.
Next, others may argue the Proposed Policy will not work because
concussion research is in its infancy. The extent of damage that
immediate and long-term impacts have on the brain is still contested and
the susceptibility of certain individuals to concussions, as compared to
others, remains unknown. Thus, opponents may further contend that
the impact of the plan will be minimal, as even educated medical
personnel cannot conclusively determine if an athlete has sustained a
concussion. Nevertheless, the third-party medical personnel will greatly
limit the occurrences of concussions, as the individual is formally
educated on concussion recognition and diagnosis; therefore, eliminating
any impact that inadequate education has on disclosure and treatment.
Correspondingly, the medical specialist will be able to affirmatively
determine the severity of an injury rather than simply disregarding any
symptoms, as is currently the case.
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Although the inherently violent, man-making culture of football will
arguably never be eliminated, the Proposed Policy will help to alleviate
some of the most unfortunate consequences that result. Under the
Proposed Policy, a student-athlete will be more incentivized to disclose
his symptoms to ensure that his eligibility is not affected. Additionally,
the independent medical specialist will guarantee that no concussioncausing hit will go unexamined. Finally, the proposed policy will assure
that the NCAA is upholding its promise to protect those most vulnerable
in college football.
V. CONCLUSION
Jordan Matthews was a casualty of the current NCAA Concussion
Policy when he readily sacrificed his physical and mental well-being for
his team, just as any athlete would.287
Evidently, the win at
Vanderbilt’s fingertips was more important than Matthews’ health.288
Ultimately, however, Vanderbilt lost.289 In his post-game interview,
Matthews contended that the vomiting was likely due to rehydrating
with intravenous (“IV”) fluids in the third quarter.290 Whether an IV or
a concussion prompted his nausea is irrelevant.291 A symptomatic, star
athlete was allowed to remain in play without ever undergoing
concussion testing—an increasingly familiar situation with an often
unfavorable outcome.292
The current NCAA Concussion Policy must be revised to alleviate its
ineffectiveness and ensure added safeguards. The NCAA must redraft
287
See Kevin Kaut et al., Reports of Head Injury and Symptom Knowledge Among College
Athletes: Implications for Assessment and Educational Intervention, CLINICAL J. SPORTS MED.
213 (2003) (“Of considerable concern is the tendency [of athletes] to play while
symptomatic (e.g. headache, dizziness) and the failure to report symptoms while playing—
especially among football players”).
288
Jonathan Guenther, When Winning is Everything, JONATHAN GUENTHER BLOG (Aug. 31,
2013), http://www.jonathanguenther.com/blog/2013/08/when-winning-is-everything/,
archived at http://perma.cc/D8VV-L9K8.
289
Vanderbilt Commodores Schedule 2013, ESPN, http://espn.go.com/collegefootball/team/schedule/_/id/238/year/2013/vanderbilt-commodores (last visited May
19, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/36CG-6DRS.
290
Lockridge & Cole, supra note 5.
291
See, e.g., Petchesky, supra note 6 (criticizing Matthew’s lack of recovery time). “What's
worrying is that he wasn't out for nearly long enough for Vanderbilt staff to give him the
mandated concussion tests. Was he knocked silly? We don't know. But Vandy didn't
either.” Id.
292
See Isaac Rauch, “What A Man”: Reactions to the University of Arizona’s Negligent
Treatment of Matt Scott’s Concussion, DEADSPIN (Oct. 28, 2012, 11:03 AM),
http://deadspin.com/5955530/what-a-man-reactions-to-the-university-of-arizonasnegligent-treatment-of-matt-scotts-concussion, archived at http://perma.cc/8TWQ-8RBW
(criticizing quarterback Matt Scott’s reentry after two blows to the head followed by
profuse vomiting); Sandritter, supra note 173 (elaborating on Shane Morris’ quick return).
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the current Policy to make eligibility contingent upon an athlete
reporting his concussion symptoms in order to disincentivize
nondisclosure, as well as minimize outside influences on his reporting.
Moreover, unassociated medical specialists should be provided at each
game to reduce the occurrence of multiple head traumas and to eliminate
the added pressure of coaches and member institutions on an affiliated
medical personnel’s return-to-play decisions.
Finally, the newly
implemented system must be annually evaluated to ensure athletes are
receiving the most effective treatment. Thus, creating a system that
allows the NCAA to perform the very duty it was created to maintain.
At the end of the day, it’s football. When the game is on the line,
most athletes would likely make the same decision as Jordan Matthews.
However, it is a decision that should not have been Matthews’ to make.
Therefore, although the culture of football may never change, and it may
always maintain a man-mutilating, money-making, gladiatorial
reputation, death by football is can undoubtedly be a curable evil.
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